The WSJ in a subsequent story identified George Person, recently retired head of the recall division at NHTSA, as the source.  (see No Black Box Exoneration for Toyota and Lawsuits Fill in Outline of Toyota Sudden Acceleration Cover-Up)

Person’s leak appears to have prompted the briefing and, based on the briefing memo, Person accurately described the findings.  But what is missing from the WSJ – and most other reports about the data – is context.

(And while we’re on the topic of Person, we failed to mention that we do appreciate Mr. Person’s concern about government transparency – Person told the WSJ “When I asked why it hadn’t been published, I was told that the secretary’s office didn’t want to release it.”  But he lost us when he claimed “The agency has for too long ignored what I believe is the root cause of the unintended acceleration cases … It’s driver error.  It’s pedal misapplication and that what this data shows.”  Sorry George, but, we still hold fast that your statement tells more about your bias than it does the facts.)

Let’s start with the data, what is it and what has NHTSA disclosed about it:

NHTSA claims it conducted 58 field inspections and the vehicles it selected for inspection were crashes in which:

“There was an allegation of unintended acceleration or the possibility of unintended acceleration based on preliminary incident information; the vehicle was still available with the EDR intact; the vehicle contained an EDR with pre-crash data; and the owner of the vehicle was willing to allow NHTSA to read the EDR.  It is also important to note that most Toyota models manufactured before 2007 were not equipped with EDRs capable of pre-crash data.”

NHTSA noted that it gleaned the following breakdown from the data in the 58 cases:

35 showed no brake application

14 involved partial braking

9 involved braking late in the crash

3 involved early braking

2 involved mid-event braking

1 event was said to have involved pedal entrapment

1 event showed both brake and accelerator application

1 case the EDR contained information related to a separate incident

1 case NHTSA is still working to resolve inconclusive data from the EDR

5 cases resulted in no EDR activation at all

How has NHTSA characterized these findings:

“At this early point in its investigation, NHTSA officials have drawn no conclusions about the additional causes of unintended acceleration in Toyotas beyond the two defects already known – pedal entrapment and sticking gas pedals.”

NHTSA made it clear that these data are only a small piece of the puzzle, and while driver error is a likely cause of some SUA events, the EDR data don’t make for a compelling case that this is all that’s happening – particularly as independent experts and Toyota continue to document events in which the vehicle diagnostic systems fail to detect unwanted acceleration events.

NHTSA has included in the 58 cases events that have “the possibility of unintended acceleration based on preliminary incident information.”  How many is not known.

We have examined many possible SUA crash events too, and those “possible” SUA events tend to involve single vehicle run-off-the-road crashes with no explanation and no witnesses.  While these events need to be investigated, they are far from the more typical events in which no EDR is activated, the driver, passengers, other witnesses, or in some cases Toyota dealers report first hand engines racing that can’t be explained by mechanical interference or driver error.  Some of these cases were detailed in the Multi-District Litigation complaint against Toyota which cited dealer reports produced by Toyota.  (see Lawsuits Fill in Outline of Toyota Sudden Acceleration Cover-Up)

The NHTSA EDR data don’t address pre-2007 Toyota / Lexus model vehicles as those vehicles are not equipped with EDRs that capture pre-crash data – yet many of the pre-2007 vehicles (including the Camry and Tacoma) have the highest SUA complaint rates and are not part of any recall.

Safety Research & Strategies has already addressed the murkiness and accuracy of Toyota’s EDR’s (see EDR: Toyota’s Electronic Doubt Receptacle).  And since most of the news reports failed to mention it, we would like to remind you again of an important bit of context: Toyota has always stated that the accuracy of the black boxes has never been scientifically validated. In fact, the company fights to keep the data from being used in litigation because it says the EDR data aren’t reliable.

Now, NHTSA’s briefing yesterday noted the agency has done its own EDR validation testing on two 2007 Camry’s and one 2008 Highlander and they have found “Toyota EDR data the same as the data produced by the NHTSA test equipment.” So, what’s the take-away from this set of data:  The Toyota EDRs report accurate information when the vehicle is functioning properly.  What happens when a vehicle experiences an unintended event, sets no error code, and a crash ensues?

In summary, upwards of 95 percent of the SUA reported incidents don’t involve EDR activation.  The recent NHTSA EDR data summary is interesting and worth further examination, but it clearly cannot be extrapolated to the thousands of incidents of SUA in which an EDR didn’t activate and witnesses report racing engines without driver input or mechanical interference.

Interesting fact: A raft of academic and industry studies show that customers who complain and have their complaint successfully resolved bring in more money to the company than it costs to fix the problem.

In the topsy-turvy Toyota World, however, it’s the customers who are already happy that get the red carpet treatment and big bucks. Have you heard about Nick and Sharyn Davis, from Parker County, Texas? You will soon. According to The Weatherford Democrat, the Davises are among the lucky winners in a Toyota advertising campaign, touting “real people with real stories about their Toyotas. And, the Davises are part of those real people.”

A crew of nearly 100 from an LA ad agency and a catering truck descended on the Davises’ remote ranch. And, after signing the couple up to the Screen Actors Guild, and a 12-hour shoot, the checks started rolling in.  By keeping it real for Toyota, the Davises have made $23,000 and counting.

Gee, we’ve got real people with real stories about Toyotas and we didn’t have to pay them a dime. They keep calling us, frustrated because after they’ve suffered a crash after their Toyota took off on them, or merely a very frightening experience or multiple events with different drivers, same car, Toyota writes them a nice letter explaining that nothing is wrong with their vehicle and to please pound sand.

These are the inconvenient real stories – the ones that can’t be explained by floor mats, driver error, or sticky pedals. Check them out (more to come…)  These Toyota and Lexus owners are out of considerable cash, afraid to drive a vehicle with a dangerously unpredictable streak and conscience-stricken about selling the vehicle to another victim of Toyota’s decision to roll the dice on SUA.

Unlike the Davises, there’s no check in the mail.

“The company has completed more than 600 on-site vehicle inspections and our dealership technicians have completed an additional 1,400 inspections. We have submitted 701 field technical reports to this Committee, including on-site SMART team evaluations. These examinations are giving us a better understanding about the reasons for unintended acceleration complaints. Significantly, none of these investigations have found that our Electronic Throttle Control System with intelligence, or ETCS-i, was the cause.”

That’s so nice, that Toyota let Congress see those reports. Customers are not so fortunate. The typical Toyota experience for owners who report an unintended acceleration incident is a visit to the dealership, where the vehicle is presumably checked out and given a clean bill of health. The consumer is not privy to what precise tests were conducted or what they showed. Customers who ask for the test data are told they aren’t allowed to have it.

Diana Buckley of Canton, GA hit a pole in a Lowe’s parking lot on April 10, after her 2004 Sienna lunged forward while her foot was on the brake. Buckley described maneuvering into the parking spot at a very low speed. Her foot was on the brake in preparation of bringing her vehicle to a complete stop, when the vehicle “lunged forward. I quickly looked down at my foot, and it was definitely, definitely on the brake. I pushed down, but it was too late – I only had 10 or 12 feet to respond,” she says

The Buckleys had already experienced seven or eight prior experiences, like the one that resulted in the parking mishap. Diana Buckley says they started in 2005 and 2006. Sporadically, in low speed situations, the driver would give the Sienna a little gas and it would hesitate and then lurch forward powerfully. The Buckleys had taken the vehicle in to the dealership each time, the vehicle was returned with a clean bill of health. Once, however, the dealership mechanic conceded:

“We’ve got lots of these complaints and sooner or later, they are going to have to do something,” Buckley recalled.

After her April incident, Buckley pursued a claim against Toyota. There was a six-week runaround between the dealership and Toyota. The company sent an independent inspector to look at her Sienna, who also cleared the vehicle. Buckley asked to see the Tech Stream data along with any other documentation of the tests and he politely told her that he wasn’t allowed to share the data generated by the vehicle with the vehicle owner. She would have to go to Toyota for that information. She’s still waiting.

Stewart Stogle, a journalist by trade and a dogged consumer by nature, was also left in the dark. Stogle, the owner of a 2009 Camry, ping ponged from Toyota to NHTSA trying to obtain the details contained within the field inspection report the automaker sent to the agency – to no avail: Stogle of New Rochelle, N.Y., experienced three bouts of sudden unintended acceleration in his 2009 model and turned his vehicle over to Toyota twice for a high-level corporate inspection. While Toyota gave him a copy of the Health Check, they would not release to him the more detailed field report. Here’s the digital brush-off from regional customer service manager Vincent Favorito:

Date: Friday, March 12, 2010, 4:45 PM

Good Morning Mr. Stogel…..

As per Toyota’s Agreement with NHTSA, we agreed to perform a complete inspection on any vehicle where a customer complains about “Unintended Sudden Acceleration”…. before or after the recall fix is complete. Furthermore, this includes vehicles that do NOT fall under one of our open safety campaigns. Upon completion of our inspection, a detailed Field Technical Report is submitted to our corporate office for review followed by submission to NHTSA.

After speaking with Joel Goldschmitt (Field Technical Specialist)….Joel indicated that he could not duplicate your concern after having “test driven” the vehicle for more than 200 miles under normal everyday driving conditions. In addition, Joel performed a complete “Health Check” (using a scantool) of the vehicles operating system to ensure the vehicle is operating as intended under the manufacturer’s specifications. Last, Joel inspected the workmanship performed by the dealership to ensure that the “Safety Campaign” was completed properly.

Upon review of the various tests performed on your vehicle, Joel could not find anything abnormal that would impair the vehicles ability to operate normally and or safely. Attached for your review is a copy of your Repair Order and “Health Check” that you should have received from the dealership. These documents specifically explain what tests and repairs were performed on your vehicle as well as the outcome.

The “EDR Readout” you mentioned also commonly referred to as the Black Box only records data when the vehicle is in an accident whereby the airbags are deployed. Given that your vehicle was never in an accident it would be impossible to extract data that was never recorded. As far as the “Field Technical Report” that Joel submitted to our corporate office, please feel free to contact NHTSA to retrieve this report for your use.

Sincerely

Vincent R. Favorito
Regional Customer Relations and Field Technical Manager

Stogel tried mightily to pry the field technical report on his vehicle from Toyota’s, and then NHTSA’s hands. He’s still waiting.

Maybe Toyota doesn’t want to give consumers access to their own information because, as another persistent consumer found out – that “inspection” may not be all it’s cracked up to be. Tim Kenkel of Denver CO drove his 2008 Rav4 Limited straight to the dealership after multiple SUA incidences in a half-an-hour time span. You’ll recall that the dealership tried to return it with a clean bill of health after claiming to have done a thorough inspection. Turned out that the thorough inspection consisted of looking at the driver’s side foot well. It was your floor mat, the technicians insisted. Kenkel asked to see the documentation of the tests, and that’s when the dealership revealed that it hadn’t actually run any diagnostics. His vehicle went back in the shop for real tests, and the techs found multiple diagnostic trouble codes.

Kenkel shared his paperwork with SRS and that’s when things got interesting. One page was entitled: “Toyota Dealer UA Process Flow” and sub-titled “Scenario II Owner claims to have experienced unintended acceleration, but has not been involved in an accident.”

What follows is an elaborate flow chart involving corporate claims case managers, owner interviews, and a more involved set of diagnostics that may involve an EDR download or a system scan. Woven neatly into the chart were the contradictions that have dogged Toyota and NHTSA since this mess began — to wit:

Explain normal vehicle system characteristics that are of concern to the owner

Discuss what to do if the owner experiences unintended acceleration

Drivers are at the dealership because their vehicle does not exhibit characteristics that would be considered normal in any automotive universe. (Or maybe Toyota’s saying that it’s normal for your vehicle to suddenly redline? Not sure.) As for any discussions about what to do if unintended acceleration occurs, they’d have to be pretty short, because Toyota has repeatedly argued that UA can not occur in their vehicles.

The $64,000 question: What’s Scenario I? Kick the tires? Drive the vehicle and see if the intermittent and random fault occurs? Return it to the customer and blame the floor mats? Just asking.

If you can just whack that big dog down to puppy size, or drag your feet long enough to ramp up your recall response, maybe it won’t be so bad. Of course, denial that the problem even exists is the top-line defense. As the documents trickling from the hands of federal investigators to the press indicate, Toyota was once a master of the art.

It was proud of its success in managing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Unlike other automakers, it had pulled off the gutsy move of hiring ODI staff directly from the agency. Negotiators who knew ODI from the inside – its culture, its process, its personalities – certainly couldn’t hurt. And up until recently it helped – a lot.

Toyota considered the management of its relationship to NHTSA a critical element in dodging defect investigations. Toyota’s Washington D.C.-based regulatory team consisted of two former ODI staffers, Chris Tinto, Vice President of Regulatory and Technical Affairs, and his assistant manager Chris Santucci. Both used their institutional experience to minimize the effect of any Office of Defects Investigations on the fortunes of their new employer.

For example, according to a deposition taken in Alberto v. Toyota, in 2004, during a critical phase of an investigation into SUA in Camry and Lexus vehicles, Christopher Santucci testified that Toyota and ODI had discussions about the scope of PE04021 early on. Later, in March 2004, ODI investigator Scott Yon wrote a memo noting that the scope of the investigation would be narrowed to eliminate longer duration events where applying the brake pedal didn’t stop the vehicle. This definition of SUA wiped away all of the incidents with the most harmful outcomes – injury and death. It also helped make the whole thing go away – PE04021 was closed with no finding

That delayed action for about three years. But in March 2007, the agency opened Preliminary Evaluation 07016 based on five complaints, three crashes and seven injuries. This investigation focused solely on the role of an unsecured floor mat in Toyota SUA. However, in this investigation, the allegations were more serious. Drivers told ODI that they experienced unwanted acceleration after releasing the accelerator pedal and that subsequent and repeated braking did not stop the vehicle. In some cases, drivers traveled significant distances at high vehicle speeds (greater than 90 mph) before the vehicle stopped. These were exactly the scenarios that the agency tossed out of consideration in PE04021.

Toyota tried to hit the brakes on this probe by sending out a warning to dealers and customer about the possibility of pedal entrapment.  But the agency bumped up the status to an Engineering Analysis in early August 2007. In a series of internal emails that month, Tinto and Santucci discussed the pressure that NHTSA was putting on the automaker to do something about the floor mat situation. Despite Toyota’s attempt to fend off further action by adding new warning labels, NHTSA was on the verge of issuing a public service announcement:

“They claim that this remains a serious issue, even subsequent to our mailings to Lexus owners;  They recognize that this is a misuse issue (stacked mats), however, they believe that something about the throttle pedal or floorpan design lends itself to easier jamming than other models produced in the past; they also believe that the Prius, Camry and Avalon may also be prone to being overly sensitive to floor mat jamming and claim to have some evidence of such; they claim that jamming can occur with Toyota mats or aftermarket mats; they claim that the issue is further complicated by the fact that NHTSA believes that customers do not know how to shut off the car when in motion (i.e. hold the start button for 3 seconds). NHTSA said that they feel that this is so important/urgent that they are considering a NHTSA public service announcement, informing the public to insure they install the mats correctly (i.e. proper clip use, and no stacking) as well as how to shut off the vehicle with the push button start,” Santucci wrote in June 2007.

NHTSA was also suggesting that Toyota install a brake-to-idle override, similar to the feature that Volkswagen had installed in its vehicles and to tweak the ignition button so that pressing the button multiple times would also turn off the engine. Toyota resisted ODI’s suggestions for a more comprehensive fix. Instead, the agency settled for much less. EA07010 was closed two months later, when Toyota initiated a limited floor mat recall campaign. One year later, Toyota executive Yoshimi Inaba boasted in an internal presentation that the company had saved $100 million in limiting the remedy of sudden acceleration in Lexus and Camry vehicles to a 55,000-unit floor mat recall.

Two weeks ago, NHTSA hit Toyota with the biggest fine it could: $16.4 million for failing to file a defect report on its sticking accelerator pedals within the five days required by regulation. Let’s remind everybody: sticking accelerator pedals have nothing to do with sudden unintended acceleration. One of the documents now available online is a chronology Tinto submitted to ODI showing that Toyota had confirmed the phenomenon of slow return of the accelerator pedal containing PA 46 friction lever in high temperature and humid conditions as early as January 2008. Six months later, “a meeting was held to discuss the phenomenon of Tundra accelerator pedals being slow to return. A decision was made that the phenomenon was not a safety-related issue.”

In the offing is likely another whopper related to the accelerator defect and, perhaps a third fine related to the floor mat recall – TQ10-001, according to DOT Secretary Ray LaHood’s broad hints. The latter will be interesting, indeed.

Less than two months after Inaba bragged about saving the company big bucks with a limited floor mat recall, the Saylor family died in an SUA-related crash. From that day forward, Toyota’s SUA problem accelerated out of control. A Consumer Advisory to remove accessory floor mats issued in late September morphed into a recall of 3.8 million vehicles by October 5. On November 25, Toyota rolled out a plan to reconfigure the accelerator pedal on vehicles going back to the 2004 model year, modifying the floor area around the pedal and in some models, installing a brake-to-idle override – this fix comes nearly three years after NHTSA informed Toyota that braking in these high-speed SUA events, was, to put it kindly, challenging. On January 27, Toyota added another one million vehicles to the floor mat recall. And, in late March it added the 2008-2010 Highlander Hybrid to the target population.

Starting from the first Lexus Sudden Unintended Acceleration investigation in 2003, Toyota bought itself seven years of delay – and counting. We know that errant floor mats, sticky pedals and driver error do not account for many consumers’ experiences. Will seven years of sowing customer discontent, tarnishing the brand, losing NHTSA’s confidence turn out to be worth it? While NHTSA does not have another SUA defect investigation open on Toyota, many well-qualified electronics experts are looking at the ETCS-i to determine what problems may exist in the software, the failsafe logic or the circuitry that could cause these vehicles can go to wide open throttle in a variety of scenarios.

If someone establishes a SUA root cause before Toyota, delay may turn out to be the more expensive route. (And that’s not even counting the $1 million Edmunds.com is offering to any researcher who can crack the unintended acceleration conundrum.)

More on Toyota SUA

Toyota SUA:  Real Stories

But what caught our attention was his exploration of how manufacturers use science – or the appearance thereof – to raise enough doubt to clog the regulatory machinery and to persuade juries and the public that their products cause no harm by countering scientific studies indicating a hazard with their own bought-and-paid-for-research showing the opposite.

As recently as the late 1990s, tobacco executives were still making public statements denying the link between cigarette smoking and cancer. We can’t help but note a striking resemblance to Toyota’s insistence that its electronics play no part in sudden unintended acceleration in its vehicles, despite numerous instances of drivers battling run-away vehicles with no floor mats and no pedal problems; or vehicle engines that continue to race at wide open throttle while in “Park;” or vehicles that exhibit this behavior right in front of Toyota techs.

But consistent denial only gets you so far. What Big Tobacco needed – and got – was the imprimatur of science to lend legitimacy to the message. Michaels describes “swarms” of consultants and scientists manufacturing “uncertainty by questioning every study, dissecting every method and disputing every conclusion.” This assault on independent research was buttressed by other industry-sponsored studies that show no link between chemicals and disease or no exposure risks.

Among the product defense firms aiding industry Michaels mentions prominently is Exponent. He describes these companies, thus:

“Their business model is straightforward. They profit by helping corporations minimize public health and environmental protection and fight claims of injury and illness. In field after field, year after year, this same handful of individuals and companies comes up again and again. The range of their work is impressive. They have on their payrolls or can bring in on a moment’s notice toxicologists, epidemiologists, biostatisticians, risk assessors the work has one overriding motivation: advocacy for the sponsor’s position in civil court, the court of public opinion and the regulatory arena.”

In its 2009 Securities and Exchange Commission 10K filing, Exponent acknowledges that it is in the business of providing science in support of litigation:

“Many of our engagements are initiated directly with large corporations or by lawyers or insurance companies, whose clients anticipate, or are engaged in, litigation related to their products, equipment or service.”

Exponent also touts its ability to hustle data in a hurry:

“Our multidisciplinary team of scientists, physicians, engineers, business and regulatory consultants brings together more than 90 different technical disciplines to solve complicated issues facing industry and government today. Our professional staff can perform in-depth scientific research and analysis, or very rapid-response evaluations to provide our clients with the critical information they need.”

By Michaels’ calculations, industry’s need for speed plus a credible defense posture equals this:

“Exponent’s scientists are prolific writers of scientific reports and papers. While some might exist, I have yet to see an Exponent study that does not support the conclusion needed by the corporation or trade association that is paying the bill.”

Exponent is a frequent opponent of the plaintiffs’ bar in automotive defect litigation. According to Exponent’s 2009 SEC filing, “transportation industry-related engagements accounted for approximately 14% of our revenues for the fiscal year ended.”

Exponent entered the Toyota SUA picture in 2010, when Toyota began to lose control of the public perception and the investigative process. From 2003 to 2009, NHTSA accepted Toyota’s claim that its electronic throttle system could not fail without the engine control module taking note, despite chronic consumer petitions for investigations. But when Dr. David Gilbert, an automotive technology professor from Southern Illinois University Carbondale, unveiled at a Congressional hearing the results of preliminary testing that merely challenged the central tenet – that fault will always be detected – that had kept further inquiry at bay, Toyota needed a quick response. (See You Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape)

This was exactly the sort of situation called for the convergence of science-for-hire and marketing that Michaels describes in Doubt is Their Product. On one front, language attacking Dr. Gilbert’s credibility is being tested in an online survey. (See Anatomy of a Smear). On a second front, Exponent offered a veneer of independent confirmation of Toyota’s electronics system.

Exponent, Inc., with standard rates of $95 to $800 an hour, and annual revenue in 2008 of $228 million, was given an “unlimited budget,” to delve into Toyota’s electronics. Its first rapid-response report tested Lexus and Toyota vehicles and found: “Exponent has so far been unable to induce, through electrical disturbances to the system, either unintended acceleration or behavior that might be a precursor to such an event, despite concerted efforts toward this goal.” (See Testing and Analysis of Toyota and Lexus Vehicles and Components for Concerns Related to Unintended Acceleration.)

A second Exponent report, rolled out in an elaborate press conference, more directly confronted Gilbert’s work. It found that the fault Gilbert introduced in the Accelerator Pedal Position Sensor was unlikely to occur: “For such an event to happen in the real world requires a sequence of faults that is extraordinarily unlikely. Furthermore, the individual “faults” required individually are far more likely to result in a detectable problem (for example, setting a trouble code or entering a fail-safe mode of operation), than combining in just the right manner to produce a sudden unintended acceleration (SUA)” Exponent also concluded that it could introduce faults in other manufacturers’ vehicles without a setting a trouble code.” (See Evaluation of the Gilbert Demonstration .)

Electronics experts serving as consultants to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce criticized the first Exponent report, according to a February 22 letter Committee Chair Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak, chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, sent to Toyota Motor Sales President Jim Lentz. Michael Pecht, a professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Maryland, and director of the University’s Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE), enumerated a number of deficiencies: a very small sample size, a focus on obvious and simple failures, the lack of a fault tree analysis or a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) of the myriad ways SUA could be triggered.  Neil Hannemann, a highly-regarded engineer, told the Committee that the report “does not follow a scientific method” and fails to test “major categories” of potential causes of sudden unintended acceleration, including “electromagnetic interference/Radio frequency interference,” “environmental conditions,” the electronic control module (ECM), and “the software algorithms in the ECM.”

Why turn over this, what can only be described as quixotic, root cause quest to Exponent? Despite the company’s roster of 643 engineering and scientific staff, could any Exponent engineer know more about Toyota’s electronic throttle control system than its own engineers who not only designed it but wrote the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis that could provide so much insight? The Committee on Energy and Commerce complained that nowhere in the paper blizzard of 75,000 documents provided by the automaker was any indicating that Toyota had comprehensively tested or analyzed any electronic causes of sudden unintended acceleration – except for the Exponent report.

Perhaps this answer is also found in Michael’s book. In a chapter devoted to the hazards of chromium 6, a carcinogenic dust that is a byproduct of chromium processing, he details how the Chrome Coalition a trade association of chrome producers trying to stave off regulations to lower workers’ exposure limits, hired Chemrisk and Exponent. These outside consultants were introduced to the process through the coalition’s attorneys “so that materials produced by the consultants could be shielded under the attorney’s work product and attorney-client privileges.”

Another reason to do it this way is because it is remarkably effective. On the field of academic battle, Bowman & Brooke scared SIUC badly enough to shut down Gilbert’s work with Toyota accelerator pedal position sensors. And there isn’t much of a price to be paid in the public relations arena. While Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich., chairman of the Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, called the Exponent report “a flawed study conducted by a company retained by Toyota’s lawyers,” many news outlets reported the results of the Exponent report neutrally, without mentioning Exponent’s strong ties to industry defense litigation. The Wall Street Journal, for example, described Exponent as a “Menlo Park, Calif.-based engineering research firm.”  BusinessWeek characterized it as a company that “provides scientific, medical and engineering consulting services in the U.S., Europe and China.” A few, notably the LA Times and CBS, put the hiring of Exponent into the larger context.

Manufacturing doubt ain’t cheap, but unlike the products it’s often used to defend, it works!

More on Toyota SUA

Toyota SUA:  Real Stories

The cables and rods that once linked the accelerator to the throttle butterfly began to pass into history in 1988, when BMW introduced the first electronic throttle controls in its 7-Series. Virtually all vehicles produced today employ electronic throttle systems that rely on sensors to relay the driver’s intentions to the engine control module, a computer that controls the opening and closing of the throttle. Like any electronics, these systems can be subject to error – caused by electrical shorts, mis-manufactured microchips or faulty software – and leave no trace. Selling the public on the idea that automotive electronics will always perform perfectly and that acceleration can only be commanded by the driver’s foot or some other mechanical source – such as floor mats – is akin to Microsoft trying to persuade us that every time Windows encounters a problem and closes without explanation, we’ve hit the wrong button.

The automotive industry has borrowed many of these electronic technologies from aviation, where systems were developed for extremely expensive and sophisticated machines, backed up with multiple redundancies. Automakers have reduced these to the commodity level, where saving a pennies makes a big impact to the bottom line and the temptations to dumb-down a system to trim costs is mighty.

The industry is well aware of the problems that have been caused by the proliferation of automotive electronics. In 2003, Mercedes removed 600 electronic functions because of quality concerns. Executives at Bosch, a major global supplier declared at a 2004 industry meeting that there was direct correlation between the size of a vehicles’ electronic architecture and the number of defects. Other industry experts have acknowledged that automakers have overloaded vehicles with electronics, without understanding how these systems, which might work well in isolation, operate together.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is even further behind the curve. Its job is to set minimum safety standards. They do not cover every component – nor should they. Rather, the agency develops performance standards for the safety-critical systems, such as brakes and tires. This is to ensure that manufacturers have the freedom to innovate. But many of these standards were written 40 years ago, and have not kept pace with technological advances.

The standard governing accelerator controls is a perfect illustration. The original standard was written in 1972 with mechanical throttles in mind. In 1995, the agency proposed revising it to accommodate the new electronic systems. In 2002, NHTSA issued a new draft regulation, but withdrew it in 2004, after Toyota and the Alliance of Automotive opposed the test method. In the absence of regulation, some manufacturers will produce designs that skim safety’s surface, while others set a higher bar for their products. The public needs to know the safety margin behind these sophisticated control systems. It’s past time that NHTSA revisited this issue.

A vehicle that accelerates in contradiction to the driver’s commands poses an unacceptable safety risk– no matter how rare. It can be so unsettling that some who have experienced a sudden unintended acceleration incident in a Toyota refuse to drive the vehicle ever again.  Toyota, unfortunately, has chosen to attack its critics, as it doubles down on the infallibility of its electronic throttle system. But there’s some hope for the motoring public, now that these systems are being scrutinized in ways that were ignored before the Toyota crisis.

Identifying intermittent and random errors in an electronic safety system may be difficult, but not impossible. The answers are probably not in a black box. As Toyota has consistently argued in litigation, the crash information captured by its Event Data Recorder is unreliable. (That hasn’t stopped the company from placing the data in heavy media rotation when it appears to point to driver error.)

Most certainly, the answers don’t lie in the past.

Toyota SUA Real Stories

More on Toyota SUA

Toyota made this startling admission in denying a claim by Michael Teston, an unfortunate Toyota customer from Maaumelle, Arkansas.

On December 13, Teston was driving his 2006 4-Runner into a small town with the cruise control on. He had disengaged the cruise control and the vehicle began to slow, with his foot on the brake as he approached a parking lot for a convenience store. He turned into parking lot at approximately15 mph, still coasting with his foot on brake. As his speed dropped to about 3 mph, Teston heard the ABS brakes activate, followed by clicking sound when the engine raced to full-throttle. The vehicle surged forward, hit a pole about three feet in front of him. There the vehicle came to rest, with the rear of the vehicle hopping as the rear tires continued to spin. Teston placed the vehicle into Park and the engine maintained wide-open-throttle until the ignition was turned off.

Teston’s 4-Runner was fitted with OE carpeted floor mats, secured in place. North Point Toyota, in North Little Rock, inspected the vehicle over a three-week period, but found nothing wrong with the vehicle.  A Toyota Technical Specialist also took a look on January 4, and here was the result: there were “no codes stored in the computer to indicate any product concern or failure.” However, “Our Technical Specialist noted that aftermarket pedal covers were installed on the brake and accelerator pedals that increased the length of the pedals, which could have contributed to the accident described.”

Gee, Teston purchased the “aftermarket pedal covers” from a Toyota dealer as a Toyota accessory and these parts were installed by that same Toyota dealer.

Since Toyota said that the increased the length of the pedals could have contributed to the crash, seems like Toyota has a duty to recall these parts too.

More on Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration

But we’ve been looking back – specifically at eight deaths that occurred during a six month window in 2003 and 2004 that alleged unintended acceleration. These all occurred in Toyota Camrys during the time that NHTSA, after meeting with Toyota, narrowed the scope of its investigation (PE04021) of Camry and Lexus ES vehicles for throttle control and vehicle surging to exclude the very scenarios that were alleged in some of these fatal crashes.  But the lost lives of eight people were apparently horse-traded out of investigatory view.

On March 22, 2004, Mrs. Juanita Grossman died from her injuries in a crash that rocketed her out of a pharmacy parking lot, into another vehicle, then into one building and finally, the offices of Statewide Realty. (They still remember the crash very well.) The EMTs who extracted Mrs. Grossman noted that both feet were “jammed” on the brake pedal.

Remember: Toyota says the brakes always work and its electronic throttle system never fails unless the computer records it and the vehicle goes into limp-home mode.

So, how does one slam at full throttle into a building with both feet on the brake? We’re very curious. Toyota and NHTSA? Not so much.

We’ve taken a closer look at the public record on these incidents and we’re posting our analysis. Read our addendum.

First, the recent recalls do not, we repeat, do not cover all of the vehicles plagued by SUA. In fact, the most troubled vehicle in Toyota’s fleet – as measured by consumer complaints, the 2002 and 2006 Camry, is not a part of any recall.

Second, neither floor mats nor sticking accelerator pedals explain many, many incidents of Toyota SUA – and yet, when floor mats was a convenient explanation, Toyota pushed it – even when it did not fit the facts. And if we want to talk about sticking accelerator pedals and Toyota’s swift and forthright action, let’s go back to the December 2005 recall for Lexus IS250s with accelerator pedals “out of tolerance” – meaning the pedal could become stuck. By December 16, Toyota sent a Notice of Defect and Noncompliance to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and four days later, a notice was over-nighted to dealers instructing them to replace the acceleration pedal assembly with a revised one, and to modify the carpet. That pedal, by the way, was manufactured by Denso – not CTS, the supplier currently being blamed.

Third, why should consumers put any stock in Toyota’s confidence? For years, Toyota insisted that there were no problems at all. It has told numerous consumers and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that there is nothing wrong with its vehicles. In fact, in its first all-weather floor mat recall 07E082, even as the company filed a defect notice in September 2007, it insisted that there was no defect:

“Toyota has carefully evaluated the agency’s concerns in the defect investigation EA07-010 and has concluded that the subject vehicles do not contain a safety related defect. Witb respect to the All Weather Floor Mats that are associated with the field incidents reported in EA07-010, Toyota concluded that the mats do not contain a safety-related defect; however, Toyota agrees that an unsecured All Weather Floor Mat, especially one that is stacked on top of another floor mat, can migrate toward the accelerator pedal, potentially preventing it from returning to idle.”

Yes, yes. Careful evaluation. It’s easy to buffalo the media – most don’t read the whole record. We do. And there’s a lot more about Toyota’s role in creating this mess than you’ve read in the newspapers.

“This is a desperate move by a company desperate to control a situation that has already spiraled out of control,” says SRS president Sean E. Kane. “We know that Toyota sudden Unintended Acceleration is a multi-faceted problem across many model lines and models years. This move might buy them a brief distraction, but the problems aren’t going away even after a fix is in place for the vehicles included in this recent recall.”

Unintended acceleration is occurring across a number of Toyota makes, models and years and under varying circumstances.  Based on Safety Research & Strategies’ review of complaints, owner interviews and vehicle inspections, there appears to be a multitude of root causes ranging from mechanical interface to unidentified electronic defects.  Thus far, Toyota has only been willing to recall some vehicles for mechanical defects.  Many vehicle models with high rates of unintended acceleration complaints, like the 2002 to 2006 Camry models are still not part of any recall.  Regardless, all of these problems point back to the lack of appropriate failsafe designs – designs that ensure the driver can easily control the vehicle, when something does go wrong.

More on Toyota Unintended Acceleration:

Toyota Sudden Acceleration

Well, They Had to do Something!

Breaking! Roll Out the Recalls!

Concerned Citizen Drops a Dime on Toyota

Toyota Sudden Acceleration in Reverse