Did that help?

Number One Automaker Toyota has hypnotized NHTSA in several sudden unintended acceleration investigations by chanting that phrase. Its fault detection system could not be breached, Toyota said, and therefore drivers who reported SUA were nuts or incompetent.

In March, as it attempted to fend off Preliminary Evaluation 09-054 – a new NHTSA investigation into Corollas that would unexpectedly stall out, sometimes while the vehicle was in motion – Toyota invoked the magic words (formerly) guaranteed to make Bad Things go away:

“Toyota does not believe that anyone would have prior warning that the alleged defect was occurring or that the subject component was malfunctioning. However, a malfunction indicator would illuminate if a malfunction did occur,” (emphasis ours) Chris Santucci, Toyota’s Manager of Technical and Regulatory Affairs, wrote in his March 2 response to the agency’s request for information.

But that claim fell apart as the technical field reports began to trickle in.

Here’s one from Kerry Toyota in Florence, KY:

“Vehicle towed into dealership with a crank, not start condition. Technician confirmed engine would not start and MIL [Malunction Indicator Lamp] does not illuminate. The scan tool would not communicate with the ECM. Power and ground connections to the ECM were confirmed good.”

Here’s another:

“Customer mentioned that his vehicle stalls intermittently.

We confirmed this problem took some time to correct as it was hard to duplicate.

It happen while driving and also when idling. After stalling it would start up again and run fine. Then it will run fine for several days before stalling again. Complete inspection of entire fuel and ignition systems passed. No DTCs stored or pending.”

And another:

“Customer states vehicle dies while driving down the road…Technician verified the customer’s complaint and upon further diagnosis found the vehicle dies while driving. Vehicle restarts with no codes.”

And another:

“The Customer states: that the engine will crank but will not start.

The customer called AAA; the AAA staff confirmed the condition and tapped on the fuel pump module and the vehicle engine started. A few days later the customer encounter the problem again, at this time the vehicle was towed into the dealership. FTS inspection result of 8/27/04.  The customer complaint could not be duplicated. Engine starts fine (about 1 sec cranking is needed to start the Engine). Test-drove the vehicle about 3 miles in the city, no abnormalities were found. No DTC memorized in ECM.”

Is it just us, or does anyone else see a pattern here?

On Aug. 26, when Toyota rolled out its Recall-of-the-Week for nearly 1.3 million 2005-2008 Corollas prone to unpredictable engine failure, the company was forced to take a baby step toward the truth. From its FAQ to customers:

“Are there any warnings that this condition has occurred?

In most of the cases, the check engine light will illuminate if this condition occurs and the vehicle may experience harsh shifting.  However, there may be some cases where the check engine light does not illuminate and harsh shifting does not occur.”

This is first public crack in Toyota’s fortress of defense and it may go a long way to explaining why Toyota went so hard after Dr. David Gilbert’s test showing that its fault detection system – far from being infallible – is actually rather weak.

Toyotas go when you tell them to stop, stop when you tell them to go and the engine control module is none the wiser.

The streak continues. We’ve noticed a dribbling of press releases from Toyota dealerships touting the NHTSA interpretation of the Toyota black box data as proof that there is nothing wrong with their products. These headlines and sub-heads left us gob-smacked:

“Fort Myers Toyota Announces Release of U.S. Study of Toyota Crashes; Fort Myers Toyota is pleased to report that a study done by U.S. Transportation Department officials’ points to the driver error in many of accidents involving Toyota vehicles.”

And

“Toyota Dealer in Georgia Verifies New Reports that Blame Driver Error for Crashes; Athens Toyota dealership, Heyward Allen Toyota, serving Atlanta Toyota drivers, has confirmed that a study done by U.S. Transportation Department officials points to the Toyota driver as the culprit for the crash.”

There are three problems here.

Numero Uno: Equating Toyota Event Data Recorder (EDR) data with incontrovertible evidence. As we have said many (sigh) times: any Toyota black box data comes with a big caveat from the automaker itself. Toyota has long argued in the courtroom and to the media that its EDR is a prototype tool, whose results have never been validated. Toyota is still making statements to this effect. All manufacturers know that EDR data is not infallible and its results must be read along with other physical evidence of the crash. For example, a recent EDR readout from a single-vehicle, run-off-the-road crash involving a Toyota Tundra showed that the driver was travelling at 177 mph. That’s faster than a Tundra can actually go.

Two: Even if we were to accept this data on its face – 60 percent showed no evidence of braking. What does that say about the causes of the other 40 percent of the crashes? What happens when you multiply those percentages obtained in the study of 58 incidents times the 37,900 complaints Toyota says it has received? That’s a whole lotta SUA that can’t be blamed on drivers.

And that brings us to the Big Three:

Don’t Blame the Customer. How do you sell cars to people while calling them jackasses who can’t drive a sedan properly? That might work for Toyota corporate, which deals with consumers through the disembodied voices at the other end of a toll-free number. Selling cars and maintaining customer loyalty is a full-contact sport. Free advice: Leave consumers with some dignity, and go with the classic: it’s not you, it’s me.

So what’s up with the dealerships pushing this line? Although the headlines were a little different, the bodies of the press releases were identical. This smells like SMART Team spirit to us, and any dealer who is thinking about taking the bait ought to think twice.

For one, many dealerships across this great country of ours have directly confronted Toyota and Lexus vehicles exhibiting unintended acceleration that cannot be explained by floor mats, driver error or sticky pedals. We have heard from consumers who have reported to SRS that long before the issue became a daily news staple, when they took their vehicle in for servicing after an SUA event, mechanics made remarks along the lines of: we’re seeing a lot of this. We’ve heard from consumers who’ve reported that the techs at the dealership observed the phenomenon themselves, or found fault codes, but told the customer it was the floor mat.

Second, dealerships may have their own legal claims against Toyota for lost business resulting from the automaker hiding defects and then failing to fix them properly.

Fort Myers Toyota: Are you really “pleased” to report that SUA complaints can be blamed on your customer base? Hey, Heyward Allen Toyota do you want kill your future compensation claim in its crib by agreeing to shovel Toyota-corporate’s shinola?

We’re just asking.

The WSJ in a subsequent story identified George Person, recently retired head of the recall division at NHTSA, as the source.  (see No Black Box Exoneration for Toyota and Lawsuits Fill in Outline of Toyota Sudden Acceleration Cover-Up)

Person’s leak appears to have prompted the briefing and, based on the briefing memo, Person accurately described the findings.  But what is missing from the WSJ – and most other reports about the data – is context.

(And while we’re on the topic of Person, we failed to mention that we do appreciate Mr. Person’s concern about government transparency – Person told the WSJ “When I asked why it hadn’t been published, I was told that the secretary’s office didn’t want to release it.”  But he lost us when he claimed “The agency has for too long ignored what I believe is the root cause of the unintended acceleration cases … It’s driver error.  It’s pedal misapplication and that what this data shows.”  Sorry George, but, we still hold fast that your statement tells more about your bias than it does the facts.)

Let’s start with the data, what is it and what has NHTSA disclosed about it:

NHTSA claims it conducted 58 field inspections and the vehicles it selected for inspection were crashes in which:

“There was an allegation of unintended acceleration or the possibility of unintended acceleration based on preliminary incident information; the vehicle was still available with the EDR intact; the vehicle contained an EDR with pre-crash data; and the owner of the vehicle was willing to allow NHTSA to read the EDR.  It is also important to note that most Toyota models manufactured before 2007 were not equipped with EDRs capable of pre-crash data.”

NHTSA noted that it gleaned the following breakdown from the data in the 58 cases:

35 showed no brake application

14 involved partial braking

9 involved braking late in the crash

3 involved early braking

2 involved mid-event braking

1 event was said to have involved pedal entrapment

1 event showed both brake and accelerator application

1 case the EDR contained information related to a separate incident

1 case NHTSA is still working to resolve inconclusive data from the EDR

5 cases resulted in no EDR activation at all

How has NHTSA characterized these findings:

“At this early point in its investigation, NHTSA officials have drawn no conclusions about the additional causes of unintended acceleration in Toyotas beyond the two defects already known – pedal entrapment and sticking gas pedals.”

NHTSA made it clear that these data are only a small piece of the puzzle, and while driver error is a likely cause of some SUA events, the EDR data don’t make for a compelling case that this is all that’s happening – particularly as independent experts and Toyota continue to document events in which the vehicle diagnostic systems fail to detect unwanted acceleration events.

NHTSA has included in the 58 cases events that have “the possibility of unintended acceleration based on preliminary incident information.”  How many is not known.

We have examined many possible SUA crash events too, and those “possible” SUA events tend to involve single vehicle run-off-the-road crashes with no explanation and no witnesses.  While these events need to be investigated, they are far from the more typical events in which no EDR is activated, the driver, passengers, other witnesses, or in some cases Toyota dealers report first hand engines racing that can’t be explained by mechanical interference or driver error.  Some of these cases were detailed in the Multi-District Litigation complaint against Toyota which cited dealer reports produced by Toyota.  (see Lawsuits Fill in Outline of Toyota Sudden Acceleration Cover-Up)

The NHTSA EDR data don’t address pre-2007 Toyota / Lexus model vehicles as those vehicles are not equipped with EDRs that capture pre-crash data – yet many of the pre-2007 vehicles (including the Camry and Tacoma) have the highest SUA complaint rates and are not part of any recall.

Safety Research & Strategies has already addressed the murkiness and accuracy of Toyota’s EDR’s (see EDR: Toyota’s Electronic Doubt Receptacle).  And since most of the news reports failed to mention it, we would like to remind you again of an important bit of context: Toyota has always stated that the accuracy of the black boxes has never been scientifically validated. In fact, the company fights to keep the data from being used in litigation because it says the EDR data aren’t reliable.

Now, NHTSA’s briefing yesterday noted the agency has done its own EDR validation testing on two 2007 Camry’s and one 2008 Highlander and they have found “Toyota EDR data the same as the data produced by the NHTSA test equipment.” So, what’s the take-away from this set of data:  The Toyota EDRs report accurate information when the vehicle is functioning properly.  What happens when a vehicle experiences an unintended event, sets no error code, and a crash ensues?

In summary, upwards of 95 percent of the SUA reported incidents don’t involve EDR activation.  The recent NHTSA EDR data summary is interesting and worth further examination, but it clearly cannot be extrapolated to the thousands of incidents of SUA in which an EDR didn’t activate and witnesses report racing engines without driver input or mechanical interference.

Interesting fact: A raft of academic and industry studies show that customers who complain and have their complaint successfully resolved bring in more money to the company than it costs to fix the problem.

In the topsy-turvy Toyota World, however, it’s the customers who are already happy that get the red carpet treatment and big bucks. Have you heard about Nick and Sharyn Davis, from Parker County, Texas? You will soon. According to The Weatherford Democrat, the Davises are among the lucky winners in a Toyota advertising campaign, touting “real people with real stories about their Toyotas. And, the Davises are part of those real people.”

A crew of nearly 100 from an LA ad agency and a catering truck descended on the Davises’ remote ranch. And, after signing the couple up to the Screen Actors Guild, and a 12-hour shoot, the checks started rolling in.  By keeping it real for Toyota, the Davises have made $23,000 and counting.

Gee, we’ve got real people with real stories about Toyotas and we didn’t have to pay them a dime. They keep calling us, frustrated because after they’ve suffered a crash after their Toyota took off on them, or merely a very frightening experience or multiple events with different drivers, same car, Toyota writes them a nice letter explaining that nothing is wrong with their vehicle and to please pound sand.

These are the inconvenient real stories – the ones that can’t be explained by floor mats, driver error, or sticky pedals. Check them out (more to come…)  These Toyota and Lexus owners are out of considerable cash, afraid to drive a vehicle with a dangerously unpredictable streak and conscience-stricken about selling the vehicle to another victim of Toyota’s decision to roll the dice on SUA.

Unlike the Davises, there’s no check in the mail.

• Consumer complaints to NHTSA through June 7, 2010
• Toyota-submitted claims from several NHTSA investigations into unintended acceleration
• Incidents reported by media organizations
• Consumer contacts made to our organization and other firms that are reporting incidents that they have received

Every effort has been made to identify duplicate records and combine them.  However, often the reports do not provide enough detail to link incidents to other reports.  There are likely some duplicates among our records – if there are, they are few.

SRS’s database consists only of incidents reported from 1999 to the present (regardless of model year).  We have defined unintended acceleration as any incident in which the complainant reported an engine acceleration that was unintended – regardless of whether the car was in gear.  We understand that this is a broader inclusion than others have considered; however, because we are still at a stage of trying to understand the incidents we believe this inclusiveness will help us discern vehicle years / models and incident types that we may want to investigate further.

Note that the incidents we are reporting only represent those that are in the public realm.  According to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, in response to the Committee’s January 28, 2010, request for Toyota internal documents, Toyota produced a representative sample from a larger set of claims.  The Committee noted that 37,900 customer contact reports were identified by the company as “potentially related to sudden unintended acceleration.”

Toyota’s efforts to place the story with the Journal seem to be paying dividends –  literally. The automaker’s stock rose 1 percent on the news and reporters scrambled to repeat the Journal piece with no independent sources.

So, does this bring the curtain down on Toyota’s SUA woes and concerns about their electronics?  Hardly.

Recall that Toyota reported to Congress in January that the company identified 37,900 customer contact reports “potentially related to sudden unintended acceleration” analyzing “dozens” of data recorders from the thousands of complaints doesn’t extrapolate to a driver error problem.  Nor does it explain the large jump in complaint rates when Toyota moved to Electronic Throttle Control (ETC).  Most complaints and crashes do not actually activate the EDR, which only records data in crashes severe enough to deploy an airbag or, in some instances, in near-deployment events.  The actual pool of unintended acceleration claims in which an EDR was activated is very small.

Safety Research & Strategies has already addressed the murkiness and accuracy of Toyota’s EDR’s (see EDR:  Toyota’s Electronic Doubt Receptacle).  And since the Journal failed to mention it, we would like to remind you of an important bit of context: Toyota has always stated that the accuracy of the black boxes has never been scientifically validated. In fact, the company fights to keep the data from being used in litigation because it says the EDR data isn’t reliable.

In order to extract and read the data stored on a Toyota EDR, proprietary equipment that downloads, analyzes and generates a report based on the data is required. This equipment is not available to the public.  The EDR must be downloaded and any reports must be generated by Toyota or NHTSA, which has recently been provided with readout tools.  Until March 3, 2010, when Toyota delivered one readout tool to the NHTSA, Toyota claimed that it had a single prototype tool in the U.S. that could extract the data and that it would only download data if requested by law enforcement, NHTSA or the courts.  The details of the quantity and quality of the Toyota EDR data have been shrouded in secrecy.  No one, other than Toyota, knows exactly what data is recorded, retrieved and how it is processed and analyzed to produce a report.

According to Toyota, the type of data recorded varies depending on which generation of EDR is in the vehicle. Toyota doesn’t disclose prior to the download which generation of EDR is installed on specific vehicle makes, models and years and what data is available on each version. The owner of the vehicle does not know what is being recorded, and when data are downloaded they have no way to determine whether the data downloaded is complete, how the data are being processed or the accuracy of the translation.

Toyota now wants the public to believe that an analysis of “dozens” of black boxes out of the thousands of unintended acceleration complaints somehow translates to an exoneration of electronics.

Toyota Fault Detection Capabilities in Question

Dr. David Gilbert the Southern Illinois University Carbondale professor of automotive electronics was the first to point to the Toyota fault detection capability as an area of interest.  Gilbert’s testing found that Toyota’s could lose the signal redundancy at the accelerator pedal sensors – an important failsafe that is in place to prevent unintended acceleration – without any detection.  Once the failsafe was lost, introducing voltage to the sensor would cause the throttle to open.  While Gilbert’s study didn’t pinpoint the root cause of SUA, his findings pointed squarely to problems with the electronic fault detection that could help explain why an engine could race without driver input and leave no error codes – a common complaint.

Since Gilbert disclosed his findings in testimony to Congress – and several independent experts have validated Gilbert’s findings, more evidence that the fault detection system shortcomings in Toyotas continues to mount.  The SUA issues affecting Toyotas don’t appear to be due to a single root cause, rather, they appear to be facilitated by the lack of a robust diagnostic and fault detection strategy. So, when something does go wrong – whether mechanical or electronic – problems can go undetected and the engine can race without driver input or setting an error code.

An examination of a 2004 Toyota Camry by in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida revealed yet another hole in Toyota’s fault detection strategy. The vehicle had experienced an unintended acceleration event, and exhibited an intermittent mechanical throttle sticking condition. Independent experts and Toyota technicians witnessed the engine race to nearly 3,000 RPMs when the throttle plate stuck.  But the electronic controls failed to detect the stuck throttle and limit engine speed to ensure a safe condition.

Dr. Todd Hubing, a Clemson University professor of vehicle electronics, presented similar findings to the National Academy of Sciences panel charged by NHTSA with examining unintended acceleration. Hubing was able to replicate Dr. David Gilbert’s work and obtain wide-open throttle without the fault detection system setting an error code – but with only a single fault.  Gilbert’s analyses found that first a loss of signal redundancy at the accelerator pedal sensor was needed followed by a voltage spike to create an unintended wide-open throttle.  Hubing found that many of the faults created invalid signals that sometimes would be detected, other times not.

The Real World

Simple explanations are nice, but they just don’t square with all the facts. Toyota owners have complained about sudden unintended acceleration in a variety of scenarios – some have been long duration, highway speed events, where the driver was already using the accelerator. Some have experienced multiple events. Some have experienced multiple events in the same vehicle with different drivers at the helm.

Within six weeks of leasing a 2010 Camry from Campbell Toyota, both Debrah and Dave Auger of Chatham, Ontario experienced three bouts of sudden acceleration.

Two incidents occurred when Debrah was at the wheel. The first took place in the parking lot of a small strip plaza. Debrah was parking, and had shifted into reverse, when the vehicle “jolted back quite hard,” Debrah recalled. She threw the transmission shift into park. The incident was puzzling, but the Augers passed it off as a one-time glitch.

Dave Auger, an experienced law enforcement officer, was driving at about 30 miles per hour on a four-lane highway in Port Huron. He had just taken his foot off the gas, when the Camry suddenly surged forward. “It felt like a hand suddenly shoved the car forward,” Auger said. He quickly applied the brakes and pulled the vehicle to the side of the road.

The third and final experience occurred as Debrah Auger was pulling up to a one-way stop in the Augers’ subdivision. She had made a complete stop, and had taken her foot off the brake, when the Camry took off. Debrah jammed on the brake, but she couldn’t stop it before the vehicle had surged into the intersection.

And don’t forget the Haggerty case, the first significant incident that pointed squarely to electronic issues:

Kevin Haggerty, owner of a 2007 Avalon, experienced five different SUA events.

They could not be blamed upon floor mats: Haggerty did not have accessory floor mats, and his OE mats were secured in place.

They could not be blamed on a sticky pedal: Several times, the vehicle accelerated without his foot on the gas pedal. The engine would sometimes return to idle after driving a few miles or after the Avalon shut down and restarted or was stopped and put into park.  On December 28, 2009 Haggerty, a volunteer firefighter and salesman, was driving to work on a highway when the car began to accelerate without his foot on the gas pedal. He was unable to stop the car with brakes and shifted into neutral to slow the car down. Only a couple of miles from his local Toyota dealer, Haggerty decided to call the service manager to let him know he coming in. He managed to drive the vehicle by alternating from neutral to drive and pressing very firmly on the brakes.

Heck, Haggerty’s incident couldn’t even be blamed on pedal misapplication: When Haggerty arrived at the dealer he shifted into neutral and exited the car with brakes smoking and the engine’s rpms racing.  The service techs examined the car and found no pedal interference or sticking and could provide no explanation or any computer error codes.

Toyota’s regional representative in Caldwell, NJ later inspected the vehicle, but did not provide details of this inspection to Haggerty. Instead, Toyota Motor Sales authorized replacement of the throttle body and accelerator pedal assemblies and sensors and paid for the $1700 repairs and rental car costs. The Toyota dealer told Haggerty that they were unsure whether the repairs would fix the vehicle.  (Toyota later tried to blame the event sticky pedal, despite service technicians who stated they pulled back on the pedal to no avail.)

While there may be dancing in the streets of Torrance, we think it’s a little early to cue the music.

We know that Toyota has compounded its technical problem with a public relations disaster, but we’re always fascinated to learn that it’s worse than we thought – to wit Toyota v. David Gilbert.

This weekend, the Associated Press released a story by an enterprising writer about Gilbert, a Southern Illinois University Carbondale professor of automotive electronics, who demonstrated that Toyota’s failsafe strategy was supremely flawed and could result in a wide open throttle without the engine control module taking note. Gilbert, a Toyota owner, embarked upon his research out of personal curiosity and passed his findings on to Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Neither appeared very interested, so Gilbert contacted Safety Research & Strategies.

In February, Gilbert testified (along with SRS President Sean Kane) before Rep. Henry Waxman’s Energy and Commerce Committee, which has held two hearings about Toyota Sudden Unintended Acceleration. Gilbert presented his preliminary report, fielded questions from Congress, and then the fun really began.

We’ve chronicled his ensuing troubles, after Toyota pressured SIU to shut him down. (See You Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape), but AP writer Jim Suhr filed a Freedom of Information request for the correspondence from SIUC regarding Toyota and Gilbert, and unearthed some new tidbits. We have Toyota employees not-so-subtly threatening to curtail company donations of cash and cars to the university’s automotive program and suggesting that Gilbert be fired. (Toyota insists that its relationship to SIU is still rock-steady.) The e-mails highlighted in the story don’t do SIU any favors either – quaking before Toyota’s anger, after initially supporting Gilbert and his associate researcher Omar Trinidad.

Read the whole thing, its worth your time — and kudos to Mr. Suhr.

Decades passed, and so did the mechanical systems, into automotive history. The car makers began to seek the wise counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: did FMVSS 124 apply to electronic systems? Yes it did, NHTSA said.

In 1995, after seven years of issuing interpretations relating electronic systems to the mechanically-based standard, NHTSA began the process of upgrading the standard to address the needs of the modern automobile. The agency asked many questions about electronic systems failsafes and redundancies, such as “Are there other predictable points of failure of an electronic control system?”

But the Great and Powerful Car Companies did not want a new regulation. They said:  We do not need any new rules – we don’t even need the current rule. Nay, market forces and litigation pressure are sufficient to assure fail-safe performance without a federal motor vehicle safety standard.

Despite the resistance, NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in July 2002, explicitly stating its applicability to new types of engines and throttle controls; and adding new test procedures to address different types of powertrain technology, including one to the measurement of engine speed under realistic powertrain load conditions on a chassis dynamometer. The agency considered this test ‘‘technology neutral.”  The new standard would not expand in scope, nor become more stringent.

But the Great and Powerful Car Companies did not like this. They fought against the agency’s attempt to establish fail-safe criteria.  Leading the charge were the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and . . .  Toyota Motor Corporation. The proposed rule had too many problems they said, and the agency lost heart. In November 2004, NHTSA withdrew the rulemaking, saying it would do further research on issues relating to chassis dynamometer-based test procedures for accelerator controls.

More years went by, and people began to complain in great numbers that the accelerator controls in Toyota vehicles did not work right. And, lo! There were deaths and injuries “resulting from engine overspeed caused by malfunctions in the accelerator control system.” The lawsuits against Toyota began to pour into all the courts in the land. There were so many of them, that a judge had to combine them into one gigantic case, in which many lawyers would do battle. Many car buyers read the news about these problems with accelerator controls and decided that they really would rather have a Buick, or a Ford, or a Honda. Anything but a Toyota. And, the U.S. Congress took a sudden interest in the ancient accelerator regulation, and began to clamor for a law that would force NHTSA to update the standard.

And so, the wish uttered 15 years earlier by the Great and Powerful Car Companies came true. Toyota became the target of multi-district litigation, its customers fled and a new regulation was on the horizon.

The End.

Now, wasn’t that a nice story, boys and girls?

Law enforcement based this in part on the results of the Camry’s Event Data Recorder (EDR) – aka, “black box” – readout, which appeared to show that the driver Barbara Kraushaar never hit the brake in the five seconds before her Camry struck a Ford Taurus, and killed driver Colleen A. Trousdale.

A news report in Syracuse’s Post-Standard quoted Auburn Police Lt. Shawn Butler, thus:

“What that showed us is the five seconds prior to the crash, that her vehicle was steadily increasing in speed and that there was no application of brake at all. And the accelerator was in both the off and on position, fluctuating, in the last five seconds.”

Because of her condition (unspecified) police did not charge Krushaar in the crash. But did the EDR give an accurate account of the driver’s actions? Would Toyota swear to it in a court of law? We’re guessing not, since Toyota has always maintained that the data obtained by its EDRs is unreliable. (Unless it points to driver error.)

Last month, with great fanfare, Toyota announced that it would make 150 Event Data Recorder readout devices available, with some going to NHTSA and Transport Canada and was furiously training field techs on how to use them. Toyota also announced that it was “developing new policies and procedures for responding to direct customer requests for EDR readouts and data hand-off to help ensure a smoother, more informed process for all parties involved” and was “actively developing plans to transition to a commercially available EDR readout device and software package.”

“By increasing the number of Event Data Recorder readout devices and training more staff across the country, Toyota is better prepared to respond to customer concerns quickly and address their needs more effectively,” said Steve St. Angelo, Toyota Chief Quality Officer for North America. “We have delivered on this pledge to our customers and to Congress as we continue working hard to set a new standard of customer care at Toyota.”

Whew! We got tired just reading about it. Toyota was forced to get busy a few months ago, after admitting to the House Energy and Commerce Committee that Toyota owned the only readout tool in the entire US capable of reading the data from its Event Data Recorder.

It’s too bad that Toyota doesn’t think much about accuracy of the black box results. Toyota has staked out this position numerous times in the press and in litigation.

For example in response to questions by the LA Times on its EDRs, Toyota said:

“Given the fact that the readout tool is a prototype and has not been validated, it is Toyota’s policy not to use EDR data in its investigations. However, Toyota has used the readout tool under certain circumstances.”

In James McAlonan v. Toyota Motor Corporation, et al, Toyota argued that the EDR data retrieved from a 2003 Toyota Echo in November of 2007 should be excluded as evidence because of the lack of reliability of the data. In the affidavit of Toyota Design and Technical Analysis Manger Mark Kastis, he specifically points out that the readout is unreliable because there were errors and anomalies in the readout; that those errors have not been explained by controlled crash test results; repeatable laboratory test results; or extensive field experience; how were they resolved by specific corroboration from physical evidence. He also conceded that the readout tool has never been validated:

“The prototype readout tool used to perform the readout in this litigation had never before been used to read out data from a 2003 Echo EDR involved in a real world crash. The readout tool has not been validated as a reliable device to accurately convert the data contained in this EDR to the form presented in the readout report,” Kastis said.

Similarly, the general information section in Toyota’s SRS Event Data Recorder Operation Manual specifically states:

“The accuracy of the memory of Toyota’s Event Data Recorder (“EDR”) is still being validated, and the readout tool for the EDR is still in the prototype stage. Toyota cannot verify the complete reliability of such information, unless such data can be independently corroborated, e.g., through physical evidence, etc.”

According to publicly-available sources, Toyota has been installing airbag Event Data Recorders in its vehicles since the 2001 model year, and vehicle stability control EDRs since the 2000 model year, both focusing on frontal crashes.  In 2002, Toyota expanded capabilities to include rollover events. In 2004, it developed technology to incorporate side impact collisions.  However, according to a deposition of Toyota engineer Motoki Shibata, Toyota has actually been able to record and download vehicle data as far back as 1997.  In addition, Toyota’s Hybrid vehicles can report Operation History Data which records special operations performed by the driver and the number of times abnormal conditions that have been input into the Hybrid Vehicle (HV) control ECU.  The history recorded includes accelerator and brake application information. This data is retrieved using a Toyota tool called a Techstream. Unlike the EDR readout tool, this is available to the public for purchase.

The details of the quantity and quality of the Toyota EDR data have been shrouded in secrecy.  No one, other than Toyota, knows exactly what data is recorded, retrieved and how it is processed and analyzed to produce a report.

According to Toyota, the type of data recorded varies depending on which generation of EDR is in the vehicle. Examples of the data that can be recorded include engine speed, whether the brake pedal was applied or not, vehicle speed, to what extent the accelerator pedal was depressed, position of the transmission shift lever, whether the driver and front passenger wore seat belts or not, driver’s seat position, SRS air bag deployment data and SRS air bag system diagnostic data. What Toyota doesn’t disclose prior to the download, is which generation of EDR is installed on specific vehicle makes, models and years and what data is available on each version. The owner of the vehicle does not know what is being recorded and when the data is downloaded, nor do they have any way to determine if the data downloaded is complete and accurately translated.

Lest you think that we are picking on Toyota – other manufacturers have been less than honest about the capabilities of their EDRs in the past – and their EDRS have recorded inaccuracies – or at least large discrepancies between what the readout says and what the physical evidence shows.

In a study entitled, Evaluation of Event Data Recorders in Full Systems Crash Tests, the authors examined Ford and General Motors EDRs. They concluded:

“The majority of the EDRs examined in this study did not record the entire event. In one-third of the GM tests (10 of 30), 10 percent or more of the crash pulse duration was not recorded. In two of the four Ford tests, the last 100 ms of the crash pulse was not recorded. A data loss of this magnitude would prevent a crash investigator from using an EDR to even estimate the true delta-V of a vehicle.”

In a presentation, GM’s then Executive Director of Vehicle Safety, Robert C. Lange noted that when using EDR data, one must always account for and correlate data with physical information. In Mary Acker v. General Motors, the EDR recorded an air bag deployment but the air bags did not actually deploy. In Prudencia Sanchez v. General Motors, the EDR download indicated that the driver’s seat belt status was buckled in the non-deployment event and unbuckled in the deployment event that occurred immediately afterwards.

What is disturbing in Toyota’s case is how readily Toyota will use it to impeach the testimony of consumers and how law enforcement officials, who aren’t aware of the unreliability of Toyota EDR data and murkiness of its download process accept the results.

So, to review: Toyota’s EDR data is unreliable; the type of data recorded for each make and model is known only to Toyota; the readout tool has never been validated.

One might logically ask: if Toyota’s EDR is so useless, why make so many readout tools available? For that, you need the readout tool for Toyota press releases, developed by Safety Research & Strategies. Don’t worry: anyone can have one and no special training is required! Just substitute the words “public relations” anytime you see the word “quality” or the acronym “SMART,” as in the automakers new rapid response “SMART” teams.

Works pretty good.

“The company has completed more than 600 on-site vehicle inspections and our dealership technicians have completed an additional 1,400 inspections. We have submitted 701 field technical reports to this Committee, including on-site SMART team evaluations. These examinations are giving us a better understanding about the reasons for unintended acceleration complaints. Significantly, none of these investigations have found that our Electronic Throttle Control System with intelligence, or ETCS-i, was the cause.”

That’s so nice, that Toyota let Congress see those reports. Customers are not so fortunate. The typical Toyota experience for owners who report an unintended acceleration incident is a visit to the dealership, where the vehicle is presumably checked out and given a clean bill of health. The consumer is not privy to what precise tests were conducted or what they showed. Customers who ask for the test data are told they aren’t allowed to have it.

Diana Buckley of Canton, GA hit a pole in a Lowe’s parking lot on April 10, after her 2004 Sienna lunged forward while her foot was on the brake. Buckley described maneuvering into the parking spot at a very low speed. Her foot was on the brake in preparation of bringing her vehicle to a complete stop, when the vehicle “lunged forward. I quickly looked down at my foot, and it was definitely, definitely on the brake. I pushed down, but it was too late – I only had 10 or 12 feet to respond,” she says

The Buckleys had already experienced seven or eight prior experiences, like the one that resulted in the parking mishap. Diana Buckley says they started in 2005 and 2006. Sporadically, in low speed situations, the driver would give the Sienna a little gas and it would hesitate and then lurch forward powerfully. The Buckleys had taken the vehicle in to the dealership each time, the vehicle was returned with a clean bill of health. Once, however, the dealership mechanic conceded:

“We’ve got lots of these complaints and sooner or later, they are going to have to do something,” Buckley recalled.

After her April incident, Buckley pursued a claim against Toyota. There was a six-week runaround between the dealership and Toyota. The company sent an independent inspector to look at her Sienna, who also cleared the vehicle. Buckley asked to see the Tech Stream data along with any other documentation of the tests and he politely told her that he wasn’t allowed to share the data generated by the vehicle with the vehicle owner. She would have to go to Toyota for that information. She’s still waiting.

Stewart Stogle, a journalist by trade and a dogged consumer by nature, was also left in the dark. Stogle, the owner of a 2009 Camry, ping ponged from Toyota to NHTSA trying to obtain the details contained within the field inspection report the automaker sent to the agency – to no avail: Stogle of New Rochelle, N.Y., experienced three bouts of sudden unintended acceleration in his 2009 model and turned his vehicle over to Toyota twice for a high-level corporate inspection. While Toyota gave him a copy of the Health Check, they would not release to him the more detailed field report. Here’s the digital brush-off from regional customer service manager Vincent Favorito:

Date: Friday, March 12, 2010, 4:45 PM

Good Morning Mr. Stogel…..

As per Toyota’s Agreement with NHTSA, we agreed to perform a complete inspection on any vehicle where a customer complains about “Unintended Sudden Acceleration”…. before or after the recall fix is complete. Furthermore, this includes vehicles that do NOT fall under one of our open safety campaigns. Upon completion of our inspection, a detailed Field Technical Report is submitted to our corporate office for review followed by submission to NHTSA.

After speaking with Joel Goldschmitt (Field Technical Specialist)….Joel indicated that he could not duplicate your concern after having “test driven” the vehicle for more than 200 miles under normal everyday driving conditions. In addition, Joel performed a complete “Health Check” (using a scantool) of the vehicles operating system to ensure the vehicle is operating as intended under the manufacturer’s specifications. Last, Joel inspected the workmanship performed by the dealership to ensure that the “Safety Campaign” was completed properly.

Upon review of the various tests performed on your vehicle, Joel could not find anything abnormal that would impair the vehicles ability to operate normally and or safely. Attached for your review is a copy of your Repair Order and “Health Check” that you should have received from the dealership. These documents specifically explain what tests and repairs were performed on your vehicle as well as the outcome.

The “EDR Readout” you mentioned also commonly referred to as the Black Box only records data when the vehicle is in an accident whereby the airbags are deployed. Given that your vehicle was never in an accident it would be impossible to extract data that was never recorded. As far as the “Field Technical Report” that Joel submitted to our corporate office, please feel free to contact NHTSA to retrieve this report for your use.

Sincerely

Vincent R. Favorito
Regional Customer Relations and Field Technical Manager

Stogel tried mightily to pry the field technical report on his vehicle from Toyota’s, and then NHTSA’s hands. He’s still waiting.

Maybe Toyota doesn’t want to give consumers access to their own information because, as another persistent consumer found out – that “inspection” may not be all it’s cracked up to be. Tim Kenkel of Denver CO drove his 2008 Rav4 Limited straight to the dealership after multiple SUA incidences in a half-an-hour time span. You’ll recall that the dealership tried to return it with a clean bill of health after claiming to have done a thorough inspection. Turned out that the thorough inspection consisted of looking at the driver’s side foot well. It was your floor mat, the technicians insisted. Kenkel asked to see the documentation of the tests, and that’s when the dealership revealed that it hadn’t actually run any diagnostics. His vehicle went back in the shop for real tests, and the techs found multiple diagnostic trouble codes.

Kenkel shared his paperwork with SRS and that’s when things got interesting. One page was entitled: “Toyota Dealer UA Process Flow” and sub-titled “Scenario II Owner claims to have experienced unintended acceleration, but has not been involved in an accident.”

What follows is an elaborate flow chart involving corporate claims case managers, owner interviews, and a more involved set of diagnostics that may involve an EDR download or a system scan. Woven neatly into the chart were the contradictions that have dogged Toyota and NHTSA since this mess began — to wit:

Explain normal vehicle system characteristics that are of concern to the owner

Discuss what to do if the owner experiences unintended acceleration

Drivers are at the dealership because their vehicle does not exhibit characteristics that would be considered normal in any automotive universe. (Or maybe Toyota’s saying that it’s normal for your vehicle to suddenly redline? Not sure.) As for any discussions about what to do if unintended acceleration occurs, they’d have to be pretty short, because Toyota has repeatedly argued that UA can not occur in their vehicles.

The $64,000 question: What’s Scenario I? Kick the tires? Drive the vehicle and see if the intermittent and random fault occurs? Return it to the customer and blame the floor mats? Just asking.