Well, here we are, 14 months after Toyota began admitting to the world that it could no longer design a simple pedal, a floor mat or a floor pan, by launching Phase I of many phases of a recall to replace all-weather floor mats that may entrap the accelerator. Initially, the recall 90L, the mother of all floor mat recalls, was meant to switch those sneaky little All-Weather Floor Mats out of 3.8 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles.  (See  Toyota All-Weather Floor Mat Entrapment) Read the rest of this entry »

Nearly a quarter of a century ago, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended that motor coaches be equipped with seat belts. And for nearly a quarter of a century, bus manufacturers have been quite adept at ensuring that never happens. Compartmentalization, don’t you know. No need. Envelope of safety, and all that.

In August, however, U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood announced a proposed rulemaking that would require new motor coaches to have lap-shoulder belts. Specifically, the new regulation would establish a new definition for motor coaches and amend FMVSS 208, Occupant Crash Protection, to require the installation of lap/shoulder belts at all driver and passenger seating positions, and the installation of lap/shoulder belts at driver seating positions of large school buses. (Six states, Florida, Texas, California, Louisiana, New Jersey and New York, and some municipalities currently require seat belts on school buses.) Read the rest of this entry »

We all know that car salesmen are whizzes at those back-of-the-envelope calculations on monthly payments and trade-ins, but when it comes to more sophisticated data analysis – they’re not there yet.

To wit, Edmund’s most recent foray into numbers crunching: Edmunds.com Finds Uptick of Traffic Deaths Among 51-to-65-Year-Old Men Since 2000

What, you say? Who are all of these hot-rodding grandfathers dying shamelessly at increasing rates? And more importantly, how come whenever we’re stuck behind one of them, they seem to be driving so slowly?

“According to NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the number of annual traffic fatalities for men 51-65 rose by almost one-quarter from 2000 to 2009 (the last year for which data is available). In comparison, annual fatality figures for all male drivers during that time declined more than 20 percent. Fatality figures for female drivers also declined 20 percent during the ten-year period,” the press release said.

“We spend a lot of worthwhile energy teaching younger generations about the virtues of staying safe on the road — especially when it comes to the dangers of drinking and driving — and based on the stats, it looks like they’re getting that message,” said Edmunds.com CEO Jeremy Anwyl. “But the baby boomer generation is not heeding the same advice they’re giving to their children. There needs to be a longer look at why there are more traffic deaths within this age group while all others are seeing fewer.”

Excellent point! Statistician Randy Whitfield has done just that, and it appears that the problem is not over-the-hill hypocrites climbing behind the wheel, half-cocked on too many martoonies. It’s data analysis that fails to employ standard statistical methodologies and controls.

Whitfield analyzed driver death rates for the U.S. population in standard age ranges from 50 through 69, to fully overlap the Edmund’s study group, using NHTSA’s FARS data for and Federal Highway Administration drivers’ licensure data, both from calendar years 2000-2009. Whitfield found that the increase in deaths is related to the increase in the number of licensed drivers. Male licensed drivers in the 59-60 age group rose by 33 percent over the study period, but increase in death was actually slower at 21 percent.

Whitfield’s takeaway?

“Edmunds asked why there are more traffic deaths in 2009 compared to 2000 within the 51-65 age group, while all other age groups have fewer deaths. An answer that does not involve recourse to unmeasured, hypothetical driver attitudes toward safety is that there are so many more drivers in this age group in 2009 than there were in 2000. Conversely, part of the explanation for the reduction in male driver deaths in other age groups is simply that the size of that subpopulation has remained relatively stable. This demographic bulge in the population age structure is just what gave the ‘baby boomers’ their name.”

Read Whitfield’s full analysis

This “analysis,” in advance of Edmund’s exciting May conference, entitled “Truly Safe? Debunking Myths and Crafting Effective Policies for Car Safety,” is a preview of the let’s-blame-sucky-drivers mantra that manufacturers have leaned on since the first Model-T rolled off the assembly line. And, in truth, there’s speeding, refusing to buckle up, texting while driving, and any number of ways that drivers mortgage their safety behind the wheel. But are these the myths in need of debunking?

Too bad Martin Truex Jr.’s Toyota NASCAR wasn’t equipped with an electronic throttle. ‘Cause if it did, no way would he have taken that hard hit in the turn at the Martinsville Speedway yesterday.

The veteran NASCAR driver emerged from his flaming Toyota unscathed – and puzzled.

“We had a throttle stuck wide open – not sure why,” Truex said to The News Virginian.  “There’s a lot of big chunks of rubber flying around out there. I don’t know if one of those got up in the carburetor linkage or what, but just never had any warning. Went to let off to go into three and it was stuck to the floor. Not much you can do at that point here.”

We’re not sure all the theories have been explored. Did he check his floor mat? Was NASA consulted?

The commentators noted that Truex appeared as though he couldn’t slow his vehicle down – and maybe lost his brakes. Those guys apparently hadn’t got the memo that the brakes on a Toyota always overcome the throttle. They are two separate systems, and a stuck throttle and simultaneous brake failure isn’t possible. We’re serious. Toyota’s told that one to a lot of customers who complained that they crashed because their Toyota or Lexus took off on them and braking didn’t help.

Now we know that a race track is not I-95, that a NASCAR professional is no muddled blue-hair, and that the vehicle in question had a mechanical throttle instead of the vaunted, never-to-be defeated ETCS-i.

And yet. And yet, Truex’s observations – no warning, happened too fast to avoid a crash – ring more bells than a Jehovah’s witness.

It took a hot New York minute for Toyota to announce on its website that it had won a “key” unintended acceleration case. Today, a New York jury in the Eastern District of New York delivered a favorable verdict to Toyota in the case of Dr. Amir Sitafalwalla, who claimed an errant floor mat responsible for the crash of his 2005 Scion.

The jury found that the floor mat had nothing to do with the crash. The judge ruled the electronics evidence out of the trial. But we don’t think this ruling is “key” or “much-anticipated,” or “an early indicator of the strength of the legal theories behind current unintended acceleration claims.”

The verdict is an indicator that there was no proof offered by the plaintiffs, no relevant discovery from Toyota and a plaintiff’s expert without an automotive electronic design expertise.

Don’t over-think this one too much.

This month, the Insurance Institute on Highway Safety reignited efforts to address the underride problem and petitioned the federal government to “require stronger underride guards that will remain in place during a crash and to mandate guards for more large trucks and trailers.”

The Institute based its latest effort on a study using the Large Truck Crash Causation Study, a federal database of roughly 1,000 real-world crashes in 2001-03.  The organization examined crash patterns leading to rear underride of heavy trucks and semi-trailers with and without guards and found that underride was a common outcome of the 115 crashes involving a passenger vehicle striking the back of a heavy truck or semi-trailer. Only 22 percent of the crashes didn’t involve underride or had only negligible underride, which they indicated was consistent with prior studies.  The study noted that “In 23 of the 28 cases in which someone in the passenger vehicle died, there was severe or catastrophic underride damage, meaning the entire front end or more of the vehicle slid beneath the truck.” Read the rest of this entry »

Fuel “spit-back” through the filler neck has been a longstanding problem in several Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep models, caused by the Inlet Check Valve (ICV) mounted in the fuel tank. Despite some limited recalls and at least one extended lifetime warranty, this defect, which first surfaced in 2001, continues to plague a number of models. Tens of thousands of vehicles are outside of any campaign, forcing owners to pay for a repair that requires replacement of the entire tank assembly.

Numerous Dodge Durango owners have complained to NHTSA and Chrysler. Others have commiserated about “spit back” on Internet blogs and enthusiast websites, and posted dramatic video footage showing geysers of gasoline or significant fuel dumps into the concrete around the pump.

The video below was captured by David Trebacz, the owner of a 2007 Dodge Durango. Read the rest of this entry »

Dear Toyota:

Why did you buy back Tim Scott’s 2007 Lexus RX? We mean, really? You gave him a bunch of different reasons, but he doesn’t believe you. (We’re finding it a little hard to swallow, too.)

Awaiting your reply,

SRS

Here’s Tim Scott’s story. In early December, as NHTSA and NASA were putting the finishing touches on their reports saying that there is nothing wrong with Toyota’s electronics or software, Scott experienced an unintended acceleration event in his 2007 Lexus RX350, on his way home from the gym. Here’s the narrative that Scott, 46, the chief financial officer for the International Union of Police Associations, wrote: Read the rest of this entry »

Today, Safety Research & Strategies called on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the industry to correct a longstanding safety problem: seat heaters that injure disabled drivers and passengers. With no government or industry-wide standards, manufacturers have installed a variety of seat heater systems – some that  reach temperatures significantly above human tolerances or have no automatic shut-off mechanism – or both. While most drivers know when to turn a hot seat off, occupants with lower body sensory deficits don’t feel the burn. The medical literature has been documenting serious and permanent burn injuries from car seat heaters to occupants with paralysis or diabetes since 2003. Disabled motorists have been complaining about the problem to NHTSA since, at least, 2002. The industry’s response has been to bury a warning in the owner’s manual. NHTSA’s approach to seat heater defects has been: no flames, no problem.  These are preventable injuries – and it’s time government and industry began preventing them.

The medical community has joined us in this campaign.  We encourage readers to do the same by sending NHTSA, The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, and the National Mobility Equipment Dealers Association letters supporting changes in standards and practices.

See below to read our briefing paper and our requests to NHTSA and the industry:

Feb. 22, 2011 Safety Research & Strategies, Seat Heater Injuries

Feb. 22, 2011 Letter to NHTSA Administrator David Strickland

Feb. 22, 2011 Letter to Robert Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Feb. 22, 2011 Letter to Dave Hubbard Chief Executive Officer, National Mobility Equipment Dealers Association

Last week, NHTSA pitched its two technical tomes on Toyota unintended acceleration at a pack of reporters, declared that the automaker’s electronics were fine, and ran away. Our esteemed Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood then made the media rounds, grousing that the critics hadn’t read the report, which leads us to ask: Did Ray?

We’ve been reading it and re-reading it, and conferring with a wide range of technical experts – some of whom have extensive experience in engine management control design, validation and testing. And we gotta tell you, Ray, we aren’t ready to buy our kid a new Toyota.

Far from exonerating Toyota electronics, the reports by NHTSA and the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) confirm the paucity of the automaker’s safety diagnostics. The NESC team also identifies how the two signals in the accelerator pedal position sensor can be shorted in the real world – leading to an open throttle (aka, tin whiskers). Hell, NESC found the potential in three pedals – that’s a pretty significant percentage in a very small sample. Tin whiskers are such a serious issue that NASA has devoted considerable resources to studying them. They have wreaked electronic havoc on everything from medical devices to weapons systems and satellites. Yet, the NESC report treated the discovery of tin whiskers in a third of their pedal sample like a dead end, instead of a promising avenue of study. Read the rest of this entry »