Tag: trinity-industries

Trinity ET-Plus Test Replicates Field Failures

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​Look at the pictures of this week’s s field test of the controversial ET-Plus energy absorbing end terminal below: Do you see what we see? The curled steel ribbon shows that guardrail began to extrude through the feeder end, as designed, but apparently got jammed up in the chute. The rail folded back into a spear and almost penetrated the Geo Metro’s door:

Courtesy of KSAT.

Trinity President Greg Mitchell saw it. According to the pool reporter who bore witness for her fourth-estate buds: 

“Something seemed very dramatic at impact- different than the same 'off-set small car' test at the 27 ¾ inch test in early January. The damage and impact was entire front end- even looking centered for worst damage. I cannot confirm that nothing penetrated the cab.  The Trinity president and PR rep immediately went to one another with no smiles and fast conversation.”

Indeed. This is more or less how some versions of the ET-Plus end terminal – now under fire after a federal jury concluded that Dallas, Texas-based Trinity Industries had defrauded the government by failing to disclose a significant design change that saved the company $50,000 – is alleged to have performed in the field, with catastrophic consequences to actual humans.

It was the eighth and final test at the Southwest Research Institute’s facility in San Antonio, Texas. The skies were blue and sunny, giving all the observers – including the FHWA, representatives of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) – and Trinity a clear view of the small-car test using a 31-inch guardrail, with an impact off-set to the passenger side.  

The pool reporter, from her position, about 200 yards from the impact, said:

“The black & white car Geo Metro traveled down the track at approximately 62 mph and hit the ET-Plus guardrail head on but off-set to passenger side of the car.  The car hit the head and crashed through approx. 4 posts while spinning half a turn and into traffic.  Substantial damage occurred to front of this car, with not a lot of 'extrusion/ribboning' of the guardrail.”  

According to the FHWA response to Trinity’s test plan, Trinity was concerned about who would be allowed to watch the tests: “The test plan only references FHWA observers. FHWA intends to bring independent experts, members of AASHTO, and State DOT representatives along with FHWA personnel. FHW A will provide Trinity, in advance, with a list of FHWA personnel and those we wish to invite to attend the crash tests. Trinity agrees, is primarily concerned with impartiality, and will inform FHWA if they have concerns with any of the individuals on FHWA's list.” (Trinity has no particular interest in the outcome, so it makes sense to give the company the final say.) 

Nonetheless, the eleven individuals present on Tuesday were not the only eyes on this testing. After Trinity lost the federal whistleblower lawsuit that competitor Joshua Harman brought on behalf of the government, the FHWA was forced to act. In 2012, the agency allowed Trinity to submit seven-year-old test results which purported to show that the ET-Plus energy-absorbing end terminals manufactured after 2005 performed adequately in crash tests. In the wake of the October finding of fraud and a trebled $175 million damages award, the FHWA ordered a fresh round of tests, but not the off-set tests that mirror how the guardrail was faring in the field. 

Documents obtained from the FHWA by Safety Research & Strategies via a FOIA lawsuit show that in the run-up to the tests, FHWA officials were crafting and re-drafting – with guidance from Chief Counsel Thomas Echikson and many hands within the Office of Safety Technologies – responses to pointed questions from the press and U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.). 

Although the 267 pages are full of R & R (repetition and redactions), amid the effort to churn out a FAQ, a press release related to the testing plan, and a letter accepting Trinity’s  testing plan, are internal communications regarding a meeting with Blumenthal’s staff. The senator has publicly expressed reservations about the test protocol, which experts say is out of date, and the lack of a crash test that mimics field performance.

According to documents released by the agency, ABC producer Cindy Galli also posed a series of questions to the FHWA – among them, about Trinity’s financial ties to the SWRI, and whether the results of these tests would conclude the matter for the federal government. The agency responded:

"We're reviewing data to determine whether the ET-Plus and other comparable end treatments have vulnerabilities under conditions not covered by NCH RP 350 testing and are considering whether additional analyses, including evaluations of the end treatments' performance on roads, are warranted.•

Surely, Trinity President Greg Mitchell would agree. In a November 6 letter, he presented his bonafides to the FHWA:

“The safety of the American driving public is very important to Trinity, and we take very seriously the safety of the products that we manufacture for installation on the nation's roadways. We believe that this process will confirm going forward that our products meet the NCHRP Report 350 standards.” 

As the Safety Record Blog knows from reading so many letters of this variety, everybody and their Grandmas takes safety seriously. How one’s somber mien translates into demonstrable action – ah, here is where there is much disagreement. Scientific studies show that a sizeable percentage of people who say that they take safety seriously believe that this utterance alone suffices. 

Now that there is videotaped evidence that the process did not provide Trinity or the FHWA with the unequivocal confirmation that the ET-Plus is a NCHRP standard-bearer, what are either going to do about it?

Industry Experts Urge FHWA to Test Trinity Guardrails Properly

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Last Monday, a federal jury in Marshall, Texas forced the Federal Highway Administration to do what state directors of transportation could not – launch an investigation into the crashworthiness of the ET-Plus guardrail end terminal. The agency, which, two years ago accepted Trinity Industries’ old test reports and spent most of its efforts deflecting the concerns of state highway officials and the questions from journalists, ordered the Texas-based manufacturer of highway safety equipment to submit to a new testing regime.

But, the lead designer of the ET-Plus end terminal’s predecessor the ET-2000 and the attorneys for Joshua Harman, who sued Trinity on behalf of the U.S. government, have written to the FHWA urging the agency ensure that the end terminal is tested in a configuration that mimics the way it has failed in the field.

Harman, the president of SPIG, sued Trinity under qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, in which a private individual can sue federal contractors on behalf of the government, alleging fraud. Harman had charged that Trinity modified the design of its original guardrail end terminal design, the ET-Plus, causing it to fail in crashes and injure and kill occupants in striking vehicles.  The newer versions of the ET-Plus, manufactured in 2005, bear a dimensional change to the width of the guide channel, or “feeder chute,” through which the rail is extruded. Harman alleged that the rail jams in the narrower channel, causing it to fold in half, forming a spear that can penetrate the occupant compartment. In his suit, Harman alleged that Trinity changed the design without notifying the FHWA, as required, until seven years later, when he brought his concerns to the agency.

Among the damning evidence in the trial were five test videos showing the re-designed ET-Plus end terminal catastrophically failing and a November 9, 2004 email authored by a retired Trinity vice-president, Steven Brown.  He proposed changing the guide channel from five inches to four to make the terminal eight pounds lighter and save $2 a unit, without telling the FHWA, as it is required to do: “If [the Texas Transportation Institute] agrees, I'm feeling that we could make the change with no announcement.” TTI, an arm of Texas A & M University, invented the ET-2000 and the ET-Plus, and was responsible for conducting the testing that would be submitted to the federal government in support of its application for approval. TTI agreed to the change without telling the government, and drafted a test report that failed to reference the change to the guide channel and other changes to the original design, first approved in 1999. Trinity President Gregg Mitchell testified that Trinity had no meetings to discuss the dimension changes and performance issues with the ET-Plus, and did no evaluations of the product.

On the eve of the qui tam trial, the FHWA directed each of its field administrators to immediately gather ET-Plus crash data from state Departments of Transportation. After the jury found Trinity guilty of fraud and awarded the U.S. government trebled damages of $175 million, the agency directed Trinity to submit a plan for additional crash testing by Friday, or risk having its acceptance letter revoked. The agency specified that the testing be performed by a nationally accredited testing facility, excluding the TTI. In addition, whichever testing facility is chosen could not have ever tested the ET-Plus previously and was required to disclose any financial interests it has in roadside safety hardware. Trinity announced that it has stopped all shipments of ET-Plus end-terminals until the testing is completed.

The FHWA is requiring Trinity to subject the ET-Plus end terminal with the 4-inch guide channel to four different tests set forth by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), using three different guardrail heights.

It is the omissions in the test protocol that have alarmed Dr. Dean Sicking, who designed the ET-2000 while at the Texas Transportation Institute, now at the University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Engineering. He deemed “the most egregious behavior by Trinity Industries was not their failure to adequately test the ET-Plus. Instead, the primary deception perpetrated by Trinity and TTI was hiding the failed crash test results of low angle, head-on, and offset-impacts of the very ET-Plus that was installed across the nation.”

At trial, one Trinity executive testified that the videos only showed an experimental prototype that was eventually abandoned before production. But, Sicking, an author of the test guidance document, NCHRP Report 350, noted that Trinity has an obligation under the NCHRP guidelines to test the ET-Plus end terminals “under any critical impact conditions that the developer identified any time during the life.” In other words, the field failures, plus the crash videos showing the end-terminal malfunctions, demand that Trinity must specifically re-test in that configuration in which it failed.

Sicking pointed out those tests were far from irrelevant, as Trinity characterized them. They showed a critical deficiency in the performance of the guardrail head:

I suspect that neither Trinity nor Texas Transportation Institute has – to this day – informed FHWA that five full scale crash tests were unsuccessfully conducted on the ET-Plus head. These tests were ostensibly conducted in an attempt to gain approval of the ET-Plus use in a flared configuration with a 4 ft. offset over the last 50 ft. Because there was no deformation of the guardrail anywhere outside of the flared region, these tests were equivalent to testing the straight ET-Plus in an end-on, offset configuration at an angle of approximately 4.5 degrees. These are the conditions that appear to be causing the catastrophic failures that have been widely reported in the press. The unacceptable performance of the ET-Plus for these impact conditions was known to both Trinity and TIl prior to the original 2005 letter requesting approval of the ET-Plus for use with MGS guardrail. Two of the five failed tests were conducted prior to the submission of that letter. If FHWA wants to assure the motoring public that the ET-Plus will perform adequately when placed on the highway, it is important that it be tested under those conditions.

 

Attorney George Carpinello of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, who represented Harman during the qui tam trial raised the same concerns. In his letter to the FHWA, Carpinello also pointed out that crash testing alone “is not enough to determine the breadth of Trinity's false representations, or more importantly, the danger posed by the ET-Plus to the motoring public. Through discovery and expert analysis in the Harman action we have learned that Trinity has placed on the highways ET-Plus end terminals with multiple and varied internal dimensions, all of which potentially impact the performance of the ET-Plus in real-world crashes. There is no question that these variations substantially impact performance.” Carpinello argued that his expert had documented differences in installations nationwide, limiting the value of crash tests. 

He also took the agency to task for giving Trinity the option of submitting its documentation confidentially: “as I am sure you are aware, both the NCHRP 350 and the [Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware] protocols make it clear that crash testing alone is insufficient to determine whether a safety device works properly in service. Specifically, NCHRP 350 at § 2.1 makes it very clear that "the evaluation process should not stop with successful completion of tests recommended herein. In-service evaluation of the feature is perhaps more important than crash test evaluation and should be pursued as recommended in Chapter 7.”

So far, at least 13 states have dropped the ET-Plus from their list of approved highway safety equipment or suspended further use until the FHWA completes its investigation: Nevada, Vermont, Colorado, New Hampshire, Missouri, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Virginia, Oregon, Connecticut, Louisiana, Mississippi and Arizona.

William Boynton, a spokesman for the New Hampshire DOT, noted that “at this time, the NHDOT has no direct evidence that the terminal is ‘flawed.’”  

On June 8, an Ohio couple was southbound on I-93 in Ashland New Hampshire, when the sedan left the roadway and struck an ET-Plus guardrail, which penetrated the Subaru Impreza at the passenger side wheel well, slicing the driver and her companion in the legs and knees. Both sustained serious injuries, requiring long hospitalizations and have undergone multiple surgeries to repair the damage.

Boynton said the NHDOT was aware of that crash.

Trinity Defenses Collapsing Faster Than an ET-Plus End Terminal

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A jury in Marshall County, Texas found that Trinity Industries, a global manufacturer of highway safety equipment, defrauded the federal government in 2005, when it won approval for an energy-absorbing guardrail end terminal that featured design changes that saved the company $50,000 annually. In finding that Trinity had knowingly made a false claim to the government, the jury awarded the Federal Highway Administration and the Virginia guardrail competitor who brought the suit on behalf of the United States government $175 million.

The FHWA did not participate in the lawsuit, nor was it present in the courtroom.

Joshua Harman, the president of SPIG, sued Trinity under provisions of the False Claims Act, in which a private individual can sue federal contractors on behalf of the government, alleging fraud. Harman claims that sometime between 2002 and 2005, Trinity modified the design of its original guardrail end terminal design, the ET-Plus, causing it to fail in crashes and injure and kill occupants in striking vehicles.  The newer versions of the ET-Plus, manufactured in 2005, bear a dimensional change to the width of the guide channel, or “feeder chute,” through which the rail is extruded. With this change, critics charge, the end terminal no longer performs like those of the earlier design. Instead of bending away, the rail jams in the chute, causing it to fold in half, forming a spear that can penetrate the striking vehicle.  Harman has claimed that Trinity changed the design without notifying the FHWA, as required, until seven years later, when a patent dispute between the two companies brought this modification to light.

According to SRS staff who attended the trial, there were two keys to the plaintiffs’ success – a November 9, 2004 email and the testimony of Trinity President Gregg Mitchell.

The decade-old email, authored by a retired Trinity vice-president, Steven Brown, proposed changing the guide channel from five inches to four to make the terminal eight pounds lighter and save $2 a unit, without telling the FHWA, as it is required to do: “If [the Texas Transportation Institute] agrees, I’m feeling that we could make the change with no announcement.” TTI, an arm of Texas A & M University, invented the ET-2000 and the ET-Plus, and was responsible for conducting the testing that would be submitted to the federal government in support of its application for approval. TTI agreed to the change without telling the government, and drafted a test report that failed to reference the change to the guide channel and other changes to the original design, first approved in 1999.

Trinity President Gregg Mitchell took the stand and made the company look like incredibly sloppy engineers who deliberately concealed the changes to the government. Mitchell testified that Trinity had no meetings to discuss the dimension changes and performance issues with the ET-Plus. In fact, the company did no evaluations of the product.

A typical exchange between Mitchell and one of Harman’s lawyers, George Carpinello, went like this:

Carpinello: What studies did you consult, sir, or did TTI consult to your knowledge to determine that a change from 5- to 4-inch would improve the alignment of the extruder head, and, therefore, enhance the extrusion — extrusion during a head-on impact?

Mitchell:  I’m not aware of any studies.

Carpinello:  What field studies were done, sir?

Mitchell:  I’m not aware of any field studies.

Carpinello: What computer analysis was done, sir?

Mitchell:  I’m not aware of any computer analysis.

Carpinello: Was anyone consulted other than TTI and Trinity?

Mitchelll: Not that I’m aware of.

Carpinello: Did you go to any contractors and ask them, sir, whether they saw anything in the field that indicated that Trinity should change from a 5- to 4-inch to enhance the rail

extrusion during head-on impacts, sir?

Mitchell: I’m not aware of field studies that were done. No.

Carpinello: Did you consult any public officials, any DOT officials, state police, or outside experts to ask if there was a problem with regard to the extrusion during head-on impacts so that we should change it from 5- to 4-inch?

Mitchell: I’m not aware of any.

Click here to read the full trial transcripts.

The plaintiffs’ bar will be feasting on these admissions for some time.

Trinity executives also never re-ran the most critical test used for certification with the FHWA – a head-on collision with a pick-up truck at highway speed. Instead, Trinity ran a test with a small car to see if a different design change – raising the height of the posts to 31-inches would cause a small vehicle to underride the rail. It did not submit to the FHWA videos of tests with the newly designed four-inch end terminal that showed it failing spectacularly, because, the company argued, it was used in a different type of installation. Trinity’s Vice President of International Sales Brian Smith testified that those crash test videos represented a research project that was ultimately not put into production, and never submitted to the FHWA. Also several Trinity executives and TTI engineers testified that the real reason for the change to the channel width was to mitigate a wobble in the guardrail beam inside the guide channel. Neither could produce any evidence that this wobble existed; TTI engineer Roger Bligh testified that the wobble was something he had observed, but had not tested for.

Dean Sicking, a University of Alabama engineering professor who designed the ET-2000, testified that Mitchell threatened to harm him professionally if he testified in the qui tam trial.  Sicking said:

[Mitchell] went on to say that we plan to treat all the witnesses for — for Mr. Harman the same way.  And — and I looked at him and I was a little surprised by that and then he said, I hate to see that happen to you.

In 2012, Trinity Industries was successful in fending off federal scrutiny of the safety of its ET-Plus guardrail end terminal, after Harman brought his claims to the attention of the FHWA and several state Departments of Transportation. But Trinity’s loss yesterday follows another state giving the ET-Plus the boot. The Virginia DOT has removed the ET-Plus guardrails from the qualified products list and given Trinity until Friday to provide the state agency a laundry list of items:

  • Conduct testing of the modified (4″ channel) ET-Plus on 27.75 inch guardrail at a nationally accredited testing facility using NCHRP 350 criteria.
  • Allow VDOT and consultants to be present at the testing to verify proper protocol.
  • Provide test analysis and reports for new testing, including detailed product schematics for the system and the head, depicting all dimensions.
  • Immediately advise VDOT of any additional modifications made to the ET-Plus after 2005 and seek approval from VDOT for any such modifications

Meanwhile, Congress may be leaning in for a better look at the Federal Highway Administration’s acceptance of Trinity’s seven-years-too-late admission of changing a critical dimension, and Trinity’s actions in this debacle. 

Are Trinity Guardrails Safe?

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On June 8, Cynthia Martin and Richard Blaine Markland of Dayton, Ohio, were southbound on I-93 in Ashland, New Hampshire, when the sedan left the roadway and struck a guardrail. Those steel rails lining the highway are designed to execute a complex task: keep the vehicle from leaving the roadway without deflecting the striking vehicle back into traffic, while allowing it to safely ride down the crash forces.

But the ET-Plus guardrail that driver Cynthia Martin struck did not yield to her Subaru Impreza and peel away from the vehicle like a flat metal ribbon. Instead, it penetrated the occupant compartment at the passenger side wheel well, slicing Markland and Martin in the legs and knees. The spear formed by the folded guardrail terminal end cap sheared Markland’s knee caps and caused both to sustain serious fractures. Both have undergone multiple surgeries to repair the damage. Markland is still in the hospital two months later.

“I know we spun around,” Markland said. “The guardrail had come into the car. Cindy was feeling a lot of pressure on her leg. My right leg was an open fracture with 4-6 inches of bone exposed. My right foot was trapped between the guardrail and the airbag, and some flesh was strewn across the inside of the car. The guardrail pushed a dent in my knee area. I knew something was wrong. Seeing my leg in that condition, I was screaming.”

The Martin incident is just the latest in a string of crashes in which an ET-Plus guardrail failed to perform properly, with devastating results for motorists and their passengers. But, according to Federal Highway Administration communications with the chief engineer of the New Hampshire state department of transportation, it never should have happened. Documents released as a result of a Safety Research & Strategies lawsuit in federal court, show that the FHWA and Trinity have devoted considerable energies to tamping down allegations that a 2005 dimensional change to the guardrail end terminals have turned these highway safety devices into weapons, rather than seriously investigating them.

Dallas-based Trinity, the globally dominant producer and seller of guardrail systems, has been battling these accusations since 2012, when Joshua Harman, president of a competitor company, SPIG Industries, of Bristol, Va., charged that sometime between 2002 and 2005, Trinity modified the design of its original guardrail end terminal design, the ET-2000, causing it to fail in crashes and injure and kill occupants in striking vehicles. 

These allegations have been the subject of news stories and civil liability, patent infringement, fraud and freedom of information lawsuits. The stakes are high. State departments of transportation buy highway safety equipment from a list of vendors whose products have been crash-tested and approved by the Federal Highway Administration; the FHWA reimburses states that use approved equipment. So, the FHWA’s acceptance is critical to a manufacturer’s business. States rely on FHWA certification as an indication that the equipment performs adequately. Without knowing it, motorists also depend on the federal agency’s imprimatur when they crash into a guardrail – to get the best chance of surviving the crash safely.

Unlike other regulatory approvals from other agencies, such as the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration or the Food and Drug Administration, there is no avenue for consumer or the state to resolve defect issues. The FHWA has no enforcement power, expect to withhold its acceptance letter. The New Hampshire crash and others like it demonstrate the weakness of this “system,” when it breaks down.

The Background

In the 1960s guardrail designs used blunt ends that acted like a spear, penetrating the vehicle occupant compartment in a crash. The turned-down twist design of the 1970s buried the exposed ends, but acted like a ramp in a crash, causing vehicles to rollover. Today’s preferred design is the Energy-Absorbing End Terminal, which absorbs the crash energy, bends the end terminal away from the vehicle, and extrudes it through a slot into a flat metal ribbon.

In the early 1990s, Trinity launched the ET-2000, a guardrail system that addressed some of the safety failures of earlier designs, which speared the striking vehicle, or launched it into a rollover crash. The ET-2000 is an Energy Absorbing Terminal, which absorbs the kinetic energy of the striking vehicle, while bending the post away from it, and extruding the beam into a flattened ribbon. The FHWA first approved the ET-2000 in the early 1990s, and its field performance was satisfactory.

In 1999, Trinity launched the first version of the ET-Plus. In 2005, the manufacturer made a design change to the ET-Plus, allegedly to save material and manufacturing costs. The newer versions of the ET-Plus, manufactured in 2005, bear a dimensional change to the height of the feeder chute, through which the rail is extruded. With this change, critics charge, the end terminal no longer performs like those of the earlier design. Instead of bending away, the rail jams in the chute, causing it to fold in half, forming a spear that can penetrate the striking vehicle.

Trinity changed the design without notifying the FHWA, as required, until seven years later, when a patent dispute between Trinity and SPIG Industries, of Bristol, Va. brought this modification to light. Harmon repeatedly raised the issue with the FHWA, state DOTs and the media.

In the fall of 2012, three of 21 members of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) responded to a survey about the field performance of guardrail terminals indicating that the end terminals were involved in three severe vehicle crashes that resulted in serious injuries and deaths; two of the three agencies specifically referenced the ET‐Plus. AASHTO asked the FHWA to re-review its approval of the ET-Plus and document the modified barrier system’s crashworthiness under the federal criteria, NCHRP 350. More recently, in January, the Nevada Department of Transportation informed Trinity that its ET-Plus terminal would no longer be considered approved equipment because of the 2005 modification that was not disclosed.

Meanwhile, Harman’s whistleblower suit ended on July 18 in a mistrial, after U.S. District Judge Rodney Gilstrap concluded that both sides had hopelessly prejudiced the proceedings, calling their conduct “replete with errors, gamesmanship, inappropriate conduct, and matters that should not be a part of any trial where a fair and impartial verdict is expected.” Judge Gilstrap criticized Trinity and Harman over their conduct concerning a witness, Dean Sicking, a University of Alabama professor who designed the ET-2000, concluding that Trinity possibly intimidated Sicking and that Harman tried to hide his participation in the trial until the last minute, as a legal tactic. Gilstrap was equally disparaging about both parties’ conduct prior to trial, charging both with “multiple instances” of “delaying, obstructing, and failing to cooperate as the rules of this Court and the rules of federal procedure…”

Harmon sued Trinity in Marshall County, Texas, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, in which a private individual can sue federal contractors on behalf of the government, alleging fraud. In this case, Harman claims that Trinity defrauded the FHWA in selling the ET-Plus with the dimensional change without notifying the agency, as it is required to do. If the whistleblower prevails, the plaintiff can recover a portion of the damages, estimated to be as much as $1 billion in this case.  It is anticipated that the case will be re-tried in November.

ET-Plus: FHWA Hot Potato

Publicly, the FHWA has couched the controversy as a business dispute between competitors. Internally, however, documents indicate that officials within the FHWA have admitted that these questions are legitimate. The draft of a Federal Highway Administration to Trinity that was never sent, called for an “in-service performance evaluation” of the terminals and “an investigation into the crashes documented by Mr. Joshua Harman.”…”The number of highway crashes with fatal injuries involving the ET-Plus terminals does not match the excellent history of the original ET-2000 terminal.”

In a February 2012 email to the South Carolina division of the FHWA, Nicholas Armitovich II, a highway engineer in the FHWA’s Office of Safety Technologies conceded that there were “valid questions” about the ET-Plus’s performance. But, instead of independently collecting data – running its own tests, or seeking real-world crash information — the FHWA turned to Trinity to provide assurances that the design change was insignificant. By the fall of 2012, the FHWA thought it had covered its bases, and took no action against Trinity for failing to disclose the design change. It also denied a request from AASHTO to do an independent study of the efficacy of the ET-Plus, saying that in the past, the organization had not listed such a study as among its priorities.

Recently released documents from the FHWA show that its legal team was treating its responses to inquiries from journalists and the New Hampshire department of transportation with great care, and was heavily involved in the drafting of agency communications.

On October 1, 2012 after speaking with Harman, Keith Cota, chairman of AASHTO’s Technical Committee on Roadside Safety and chief project manager for the New Hampshire DOT wrote a long email to Nick Artimovich raising concerns about Harmans’ claims. He concluded:    

The question I do have is, “for the terminal units we are installing in NH, should it be providing a 5 inch feed channel or not?” We have many, many of these terminal units on our high speed facilities and this certainly causes me some strong concern for crash worthiness of the ET-Plus and ET-2000 that we have and are installing each year. I am not sure if I want to wait until the court case is decided and al l the appeals have been completed to take action (20 years from now) or be ready to answer the next set of bigger questions as to 1) the need to retrofit the devices installed along our highway system and 2) who pays? I understand this has been going around for some time and I am just now becoming aware of the issues through the complainant in the lawsuit. I will be looking toward Nick to give some guidance as to how NH and other States should proceed. Should I be worried? Should I send this out to the full slot of TCRS State members? Or worst yet, should I brief my Chief Engineer? I don't like the box this puts me in!

The FHWA sent this explanation to Cota:

On February 14, 2012, Barry Stephens and Brian Smith of Trinity Highway Products (Trinity) stated the company's ET end terminal with the 4-inch w ide guide channels was crash tested at the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) in May 2005. Roger Bligh of TTI confirmed this information on February 14. 2012. Trinity submitted documentation on various dates of changes made to its ET end terminals, which included changes from the ET-2000 to the ET-Plus. On February 14, 2012, the company reported the reduction in the width of thc guide channels from 5 inches (in the year 2000) to 4 inches (in 2005) was a design detail omitted from the documentation submitted to the Agency on August 10, 2005. On March 15, 2012, Trinity submitted a letter to FHWA dated March 14. 2011 (sic) which stated its ET-Plus with the 4-inch guide channels was crash tested at TTI in May 2005.

Cota sought further information:

I hate to be labor this issue further, but in order to verify this situation, can you have TTI or Trinity provide a couple high resolution photos of the 2005 test installation. It is my understanding they do take these pictures prior to the crash testing event? As you know this unit is being used in many States and quite expensively here in NH. We want to have some background, supportive documentation for the change in guide plate fabrication and its use in the crash test that is covered by FHWA's ((-94 acceptance letter. We checked several of our units in the field and found each has the 4-inch guide channels.

Ultimately, Cota, like the FHWA, was assured:

Thanks. This puts to bed the issue of 4 inch versus 5 inch guide channel for the extruder heads on the ET2000 and ET Plus. It is unfortunate this critical information was omitted by Trinity in its documentation for FHWA's acceptance. I am asking our NH District Maintenance Engineers as to the experiences they have seen for the impacts and in-field performance for all our energy absorbing units to see if we have a good history with the use of these terminals (ET and SKT). In addition, I am asking what issue they have experienced with the heads being miss-aligned due to nuisance hits or winter maintenance plowing impacts by wing blades. If I am able to receive good data, I will forward it for your information.

And even the FHWA was happy. In an internal email, Armitovich told his colleagues:

It appears that New Hampshire is satisfied with our response. However the question has brought the added benefit that New Hampshire will now look more closely at the actual performance of their hardware.

It is unknown whether Cota has informed the FHWA of the Martin crash, but Blaine Markland says that he is not thrilled by the prospect of being a data point in any ad hoc study about the efficacy of the ET-Plus guard rail.

Markland has been in the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in Lebanon, NH, since he was airlifted there on the evening of the crash. He has undergone about 20 surgeries – mainly to replace the flesh of his shin that was sheared off by the guardrail. He hopes to finally return home to Ohio soon to continue his recovery, and return to his job as a middle school special education teacher. Markland was disturbed to learn that the questions about the guardrail that caused his catastrophic injuries had been raised two years ago:

“It’s quite upsetting if they were aware at all, if they knew about the issues with this guardrail,” he says. “The whole concept of a guardrail is safety, and if this guardrail is causing this kind of damage, that has to be dealt with.”

SRS Sues Florida DOT for Guardrail Docs

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Safety Research & Strategies, an automobile and product safety research and consulting firm based in Rehoboth, Mass. filed an open records lawsuit in Florida state court, alleging that the state’s Department of Transportation violated the Florida Public Records Act when it withheld documents pertaining to its relationship with guardrail manufacturer Trinity Industries pending a review by the company.

The lawsuit, filed today by Florida State Representative Matthew L. Gaetz  (R-Dist. 4) asks the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit for Leon County to compel the FDOT to release the materials SRS requested on February 10,  associated with inquiries, investigations, and communications between FDOT and Trinity regarding the design, manufacture, failure, purchase and testing of Trinity ET-Plus guardrail systems. SRS also asked for documents related to any motor vehicle accidents involving ET-Plus and consumer complaints about the safety of the system.

The Dallas, Texas-based manufacturer, a globally dominant producer and seller of guardrail systems has been under fire since 2012, when a competitor, SPIG Industries, of Bristol, Va. charged that sometime between 2002 and 2005, Trinity modified the design of its guardrail end terminals, causing it to perform poorly in crashes and injure and kill occupants in striking vehicles. These allegations have been the subject of numerous news stories abroad and in the U.S., including the Florida media. Continue reading →

Safety Research & Strategies Sues FHWA for Guardrail Documents

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Safety Research & Strategies, an automobile and product safety research and consulting firm, has sued the Federal Highway Administration for the public release of documents regarding the safety of guardrail end terminals used on highways nationwide. The ET-Plus model end terminals, manufactured by the Dallas-based Trinity Industries, have been allegedly linked to deaths and severe injuries, leading state and federal highway officials to question their efficacy and safety.

The civil lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court, alleges that the FHWA violated the Freedom of Information Act by improperly withholding records and failing to respond to two separate administrative appeals on the failure to release documents pertaining to the agency’s interactions with Trinity and with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials. SRS originally sought the documents in November and January. 

Guardrail designs have evolved since the 1960s. Earlier designs used blunt ends that acted like a spear, penetrating the vehicle occupant compartment in a crash. The turned-down twist design of the 1970s buried the exposed ends, but acted like a ramp in a crash, causing vehicles to rollover. Today’s preferred design on some highways is the Energy-Absorbing End Terminal, which absorbs the crash energy, bends the end terminal away from the vehicle, and extrudes it through a slot into a flat metal ribbon. In the early 1990s, Texas A&M designed the ET-2000 in cooperation with the Texas Department of Transportation. Originally manufactured by Syro, Inc., the ET-2000, a variant of the Energy Absorbing End Terminal design, addressed some of the safety failures of earlier guardrail designs. The FHWA first approved the ET-2000 in the early 1990s, and its field performance was satisfactory. Continue reading →